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The Mandate of Equipopulous Congressional Districting: Karcher v. Daggett' —
Article I, section 2 of the United States Constitution requires that members of the House
of Representatives be chosen "by the People of the several States."' The Supreme Court
has interpreted this requirement to mean not only that Representatives must be elected by
popular vote,3 but also that each person's vote must he given equal weight.' Accordingly,
states must draw congressional voting districts containing equal numbers of people, and
districting plans are subject to judicial review to insure that this constitutional require-
ment is met.'
In the recent case of Karcher v. Daggell 6 the Supreme Court reviewed and found
unconstitutional New jersey's latest congressional redistricting plan . 7 In a five-to-four
decision, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler 8 that. no avoidable 9
population deviations among districts may be considered de minitnisi° — so small as to not
he worthy of judicial attention." Any avoidable variance,' 2 the Court held, must be
462 U.S. 725 (1983).
2 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1. Article 1, section 2 provides, in relevant part: "The House of
Representatives shall he composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the
several States . . . ." Id. "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers . . . ." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
3 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1964).
▪ Id. at 7-8. This requirement is the well known "one person-one vote" standard first promul-
gated by the Court in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) where the standard was held
applicable to statewide primary elections. Wesberry was the first Supreme Court case to apply that
standard to congressional elections. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8.
The basis of the standard is that if one voting district has more voters than another district the
votes of those in the larger district are "weighted" less since both voting districts only elect one
representative. This mathematical undervaluation, or diluting, of votes is proscribed by the "one
person-one vote" standard. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964).
5 Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 546 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531
(1969).
• 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
The terms "districting" and "apportionment" will be used interchangeably throughout this
casenote. Districting refers to a state legislature's actual drawing of the district lines. Note, Reappor-
tionment VIII, Gerrymandering, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1283 (1966) {hereinafter cited as Harvard
Note]. The number of people placed in each district is the apportioning. Id. This use of "apportion-
ing" should be distinguished from the use of the term in article 1, section 2 of the Constitution. The
reference to apportioning in article 1, section 2 refers to the allocating of the number of United States
Representatives among the states by Congress. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 744-46 (1983)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
• 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969).
9 The Court attached no special meaning to the term "avoidable," but merely indicated that any
population deviations that could have been lessened by a good faith effort to achieve absolute
population equality would be unacceptable. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 729-31.
'° The term "de minimus" is shorthand'for the Latin phrase "de minimus non twat lex," which
means, "the law does not care for, or take notice of, very small or trifling matters." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, 388 (5th ed. 1979).
" Karcher, 462 U.S. at 729-33 (citing Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530 (1969)). Kirkpat-
rick involved a Missouri congressional redistricting plan in which the average district's population
deviation from the "ideal" size vot ing district was 1.6%. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 529. The maximum
population deviation was 5.97%. Id. By contrast, the average deviation in the New Jersey plan
invalidated in Karcher was .13%, or about a 726 person variance from the ideal district size of
526,059. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 727-29. The maximum deviation in the New Jersey plan was 0.69%. Id.
The "ideal" district size is derived by dividing the total number of the inhabitants of a state by its
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justified by the state as necessary to achieve a legitimate state policy.°
At issue in Karcher was New Jersey's 1982 congressional redistricting plan." Due to
population changes reflected in the 1980 decennial census, New Jersey's number of
United States Representatives decreased from fifteen to fourteen .'s Consequently, the
New Jersey Legislature was required to redistrict the state and reapportion the state's
population equally within the new districts. 16 The "ideal" district size for New Jersey's new
districting plan would have been 526,059 people per district." On the average, the
districts in the plan adopted by the New Jersey Legislature deviated from this figure by
0.1384%, or about 726 people.'" The largest district contained 527,472 people and the
smallest district, had 523,798 people, the difference between them being 3,674 people, or
0.6984% of the ideal district size.' 9 The New Jersey Legislature also had before it at least
three other plans with smaller interdistrict population disparities. 2° For various reasons,
total number of United States Representatives. The maximum deviation figure is derived by adding
the percentage by which the smallest district deviates from the ideal district size to the percentage by
which the largest district deviates from the ideal district size. The average deviation is the sum total of
each district's percentage deviation divided by the number of districts. See, e.g. , Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S.
at 528-29.
12 At one point in the Karcher majority opinion, the Court stated that only "significant" variations
need be justified. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 729-3!. This qualification appears to be inconsistent with the
Court's holding that no level of population deviation will be considered de minimis. Id. at 733-35.
These holdings would be consistent only if any variance was a significant variance, in which case the
qualifier "significant" is meaningless. If the Court were to find that a state's plan had a variance, but
that it was not significant and did not require justification, this finding would amount to a holding
that that variance was de minimis. The Karcher Court made clear that variances of 0.69% or above are
significant and not de minimis. Id. at 739-41. The Court made no attempt to explain whether any
variances between 0% and 0.69% would not be significant. The Court's holding that no population
variances that could be avoided are de minimis indicates, however, that consistent with Karcher, any
avoidable variance must be deemed significant. Id. at. 733-35. It is possible, however, that t he Court's
use of the term "significant" may subsequently be interpreted to sanction some populat ion variances
between 0% and 0.69%.
" Id. at 729-31.
" Id. at 727-29. See 1982 N.J. Laws, ch. 1.
Karcher, 462 U.S. at 727.
1 ' Id. The New Jersey Legislature eventually adopted the apportionment plan introduced by
Democratic Senator Matthew Feldman, President pro tern of the State Senate, although it had before
it other plans with smaller population deviations. Daggett v. Kimmelman, 535 F. Supp. 978, 982
(1982), aff 'd sub nom, Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). The Feldman plan was signed into law
January 19, 1982 on outgoing Democratic Governor Brendan Byrne's last day in office. Id. at 980.
Byrne was succeeded by Republican Governor Thomas Kean. The other proposed plans included
the Roeck plan with a maximum deviation of 0.325% and 0.296% as amended; the Di Francesco plan
with a maximum deviation of 0.125%; and the Hardwick plan with a maximum deviation of 0.451%.
Id. at 982.
The Roeck plan, submitted by Rutgers University professor Ernest C. Roeck, Jr., received what
the district court termed a "remarkable reply" from the Speaker of the New Jersey Assembly,
Christopher Jackman. Id. at 981. Jackman responded to Roeck, in essence, that since the Democrats
had become the dominant party in New Jersey, they had a duty to see that this dominance was
reflected in New Jersey's representation to Congress, and that the Democratic leadership had no
intention of subjugating its partisan concerns in the districting process. Id. at 989, App. B.




 Daggett v. Kimmelman, 535 F. Supp, 978, 982 (1982), aff 'el sub nom Karcher v. Daggett, 462
U.S. 725 (1983); see also .supra note 16.
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however, these plans were not accepted."
The districting plan adopted by the New Jersey Legislature was challenged by
concerned citizens and interested groups as violating article I, section 2 of the Constitu-
tion. 22
 The plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey" against various state officers," alleging that a maximum interdistrict popula-
tion deviation of 0.69% rendered the plan unconstitutional, and requesting that use of the
plan he enjoined." Among the plaintiffs were all Republican members of Congress from
New jersey." The Republican plaintiffs introduced substantial evidence that the New
Jersey plan resulted from political gerrymandering by the Democratically controlled New
JerseyLegislature." The plaintiffs recognized, however, that no precedent existed declar-
ing political gerrymandering unconstitutional, and consequently the only claim before the
district court was that the New Jersey plan was a numerical malapportionment. in violation
of article I, section 2.28
Relying on Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, the district court held that no avoidable population
variances were de rninimis," and that the burden was, therefore, on the state to justify the
reducible variances in its districting plan." Two justifications for the plan were offered by
the state defendants — preserving minority voting strength, and accounting for projected
population shifts throughout the decade. 31 Both of these justifications were rejected by
the district court. 32 Because the court found no causal relation between the preservation
of minority voting strength and the population deviations in the plan, it refused to accept
the first justification the state proposed. 33 The court rejected the second justification after
finding that the defendants had failed to document their claims of population shifts
thoroughly and sufficiently. 34 Consequently, the court held that the plan was unconstitu-
tional because the population variances were avoidable and not justified, and enjoined the
2 ' See Daggett, 535 F. Supp. at 982. The district court found that the New Jersey Legislature
leadership was only "aspirationally" concerned with achieving mathematical equality. Id. The leader-
ship, the district court stated, believed that population equality was not the only criterion, but should
be balanced with other concerns. Id. The district court noted that the legislators felt that recognition
should also be given to preserving preexisting districts and municipal boundary lines. Id. The
legislators also considered partisan concerns, the court. found. Id.; see also supra note 16.
22 Id. at 980.
23
 A three-judge district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2284(a) (1982).
2+
 defendants were the Governor, Attorney General, and the Secretary of State of New
Jersey. Daggett, 535 F. Supp. at 980. Suit in a federal court against the state itself, without the state's
consent, is barred by the eleventh amendment. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). State
officers, however, can be sued to enjoin the denial of federal constitutional rights. Shapiro v.
Maryland, 336 F. Supp. 1205, 1207-08 (D.C. Md. 1972). See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R. FED. 29, 38
(1976).
" Daggett, 535 F. Supp. at 980-81.
26
 Id. at 980.
" Id. at 980-83. For a definition of gerrymandering, see infra note 209. See also supra note 16;
infra notes 226-27 and accompanying text; infra note 261.
28 Daggett, 535 F. Supp. at 980-83.
" Id. at 981-82 (citing Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530-31).
3° Id. at 982.
Id. at 982-83. The defendants did not pursue the second justification — to account for the
projected population shifts throughout the decade — before the Supreme Court. Karcher, 462 U.S. at
741-43 & n.12.
32 Daggett, 535 F. Supp. at 982-83.
" Id.
" Id. at 983.
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defendant state officers from conducting any elections under the plan." The injunction,
however, was stayed by Justice Brennan pending appeal to the Supreme Court."
On June 22, 1983 the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holding" that the
New Jersey plan was unconstitutional. 38
 Like the court below, the Supreme Court found
-that the interdistrict population deviations in the plan were avoidable and reasoned that
the state was therefore required to justify the population differences in its plan. The
Court concluded that the state had failed to meet the burden of justifying its plan."
Although the Court, in an apparent change from prior law, recognized that certain state
policies could justify some population deviations in a congressional districting plan," it
found that the only justification for the plan offered by the defendants before the
Supreme Court — preserving minority voting strength" — was not the reason for the
population disparities in the New Jersey plan. 43
 Rather, the Court. affirmed the district
court's determination that no causal connection existed between New Jersey's attempts to
preserve minority voting strength and the population deviations in the districting plan. 43
Accordingly, the Court held that New Jersey's 1982 reapportionment plan violated article
I, section 2 of the Constitution."
In the area of voting equality, the Karcher decision is one of major importance
because it is the Court's seminal decision of this decade regarding congressional district-
ing. The Court's willingness to invalidate a plan with a less than one percent interdistrict
population disparity indicates that numerical exactitude will continue to be the pre-
eminent criterion in evaluating congressional districting plans. The Karcher decision thus
reaffirms and tightens the mandate of equipopulous districting — the so-called "one
person-one vote" standarc143 — for congressional districting plans. Karcher is also sig-
nificant in that it modifies Kirkpatrick v. Prettier, a 1969 Supreme Court decision," in part,
and now allows certain state policy justifications for a mathematically inexact districting
plan previously unacceptable under Kirkpatrick.'
In addition, the Karcher opinions indicate the possibility of a future change in the law
regarding the different treatment by the Court of state legislative and congressional
districting plans.' Currently, the constitutionality of state legislative districting plans is
considered under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, while the
° Id.
" 455 U.S. 1303 (1982) (Brennan, J., Circuit Justice). Due to Justice Brennan's stay of the
district court order, New .
 jersey's 1982 congressional elections were held under the disputed district-
ing plan. Of the fourteen congressional seats up for election, nine were won by Democrats, and five
by Republicans. 41 CONC. Q. 391 (1983). In the 1980 New Jersey congressional elections, held under
a previous districting plan, of the fifteen congressional seals up for election, eight were won by
Democrats, and seven by Republicans. Id.
37
 The Supreme Court took direct review from the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253
(1982).
38
 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 742-44.
39 Id.
4° Id. at 739-41. See also infra note 253; infra notes 338-41 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 31.




 See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
" 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
47
 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 739-41; see also infra notes 338-41 and accompanying text.
's See infra notes 355-69 and accompanying text.
March 1985]	 CASENOTES	 567
constitutionality of congressional districting plans is adjudged under article 1, section 2.4 °
For reasons later discussed, this differing treatment has resulted in stricter constitutional
standards for congressional districting plans." A careful reading of the several opinions
in Karcher indicates that for the first time a majority of the Court may be willing to
eliminate the dichotomous judicial treatment of congressional districting cases and state
legislative districting cases." Similar treatment of congressional and state legislative dis-
tricting cases would mean greater deference to the states in the Court's treatment of
congressional districting plans. 52 Lastly, the Karcher opinions suggest that in the future the
Court will be willing to address the previously unconsidered issue of the constitutionality
of political gerrymandering — the manipulation of district lines for partisan gain 53 — in
congressional districting."
The first section of this casenote will trace the development of judicial review of
legislative districting plans. Next, it will discuss and analyze the Karcher decision, focusing
on whether the decision advances the policy behind the one person-one vote standard —
"fair and effective representation for all citizens." 55 Finally, the casenote will consider
briefly the major districting issues left unresolved by Karcher.
In analyzing the Karcher decision, this casenote will question whether the Court's
insistence upon absolute mathematical precision follows from the Court's prior decisions,
and whether Karcher is a desirable extension of precedent. The casenote will suggest that
although the Court's refusal to acknowledge a de minimis level of population deviation
follows from its holding in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, the demand for statistical exactitude can
obscure consideration of other factors equally important to fair districting. The casenote
submits, however, that the Karcher test for congressional districting, because it allows
states to deviate from equipopulous districts for reasons approved by the Court, on the
whole forwards the policy of fair and effective representation. Nevertheless, additional
judicial criteria must he developed to supplement the Court's strict numerical test for
evaluating congressional districting plans to neutralize political gerrymandering and
realize the policy goal of fair and effective representation more fully.
1. THE HISTORY OF THE "ONE PERSON-ONE VOTE" STANDARD
The Supreme Court has held that voting districts for congressional and state legisla-
tive elections must contain equal numbers of people so that each person's vote is of equal
weight." This "one person-one vote" standard" is founded in a concern with the funda-
mental importance of the right to vote." The right to vote freely is essential in a
democratic society," because it is the right which protects all others." Without the ability
" See infra section I.
5° Id.
" See infra notes 355-69 and accompanying text.
52 See infra notes 355-69 and accompanying text.
" Karcher, 462 U.S. at 786-88 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 555 (Fortas,
J., concurring)). See also infra note 209.
" See infra notes 370-407 and accompanying text.
66
 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964).
" Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 575-76.
" Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). See also supra note 4.
" See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886));
Wesberiy, 376 U.S. at 17-18.
" Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555.
" Id. at 562 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
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to exercise the franchise, citizens would have difficulty avoiding intrusion upon their
other valuable civil liberties. 6 ' Consequently, any deprivation or dilution of the vote is of
grave concern,62 and must he prevented by assuring "equal representation for equal
numbers of people."" To achieve this ideal of voting equality, the Supreme Court has
required that states draw equipopulous voting distrias; 64 and qualified voters may en-
force this requirement by challenging a districting plan which is not equally appor-
tioned."
The formulation of a "one person-one vote" standard was not possible, however,
until after the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Baker v. Carr. 66 Before Baker, voter
challenges to malapportioned districting plans were generally considered nonjusticiable
controversies, because districting was viewed as a "political question" to be left to the
legislatures." Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Baker firmly repudiated that view."'
In Baker, Tennessee voters alleged that the state's legislative districts were malappor-
tioned, in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.69 The
malapportionment, the plaintiffs contended, was due to the Tennessee Legislature's
failure to redistrict the state in over sixty years despite substantially varying population
growth among the state's districts in the intervening years. 7° The Baker Court held that
only an issue involving the separation of powers among the three branches of the federal
government could invoke the political question doctrine." Districting involves action by a
state legislature, the Court noted, and not a coequal branch of government. 72 Accord-
ingly, the Court held, voter complaints of districting malapportionment present justici-
able causes of action. 73 The Baker decision thus established that districting plans were
subject to judicial review, although the Court in Baker did not reach the merits of the
Tennessee voters' complaint."
Justice Frankfurter, in his oft noted dissent in Baker, argued strongly that the Court
was entering into a "political thicket" devoid of judicially manageable standards. 75 Justice
Frankfurter contended that districting involved essentially political issues and therefore
61 Id.
62 Id.
Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18.
" Karcher, 462 U.S. at 729-31; Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969).
" Karcher, 462 U.S. at 729-31; Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530-31.
66 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
" This view was a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549
(1946). This case was decided four-to-three, and it is not clear whether the case was dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, non-justiciability, or for want of equity. Id. at 551-56. A series of per
curiam decisions dismissing apportionment cases without comment and simply citing Colegrove
followed. See cases cited in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 202-03 (1962).
In Baker, Justice Brennan concluded that Colegrove did not bar the Court from hearing appor-
tionment cases, because Colegrove, as well as several of the per curiam decisions, was merely a refusal
of the Court to exercise its equity powers. /d. at 203, 234-35. Justice Brennan then distinguished the
remaining per curiam cases from Baker. Id.
" Id. at 208-37.
" Id. at 187-88.
" Id. at 191-92.
" Id. at 210.
72 • •, 226.
73 Id. at 197-98.
74 Id.
" Id. at 277-78 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556
(1946)).
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the Court should exercise restraint and leave districting concerns to the legislatures."
Courts, according to Justice Frankfurter, possess the ability to apply legal criteria to
judicial questions, but do not have the institutional competence to examine questions of
political policy. 77
The answer to Justice Frankfurter's concern over creating a workable judicial stan-
dard was subsequently provided in Gray u. Sanders . 7° In Gray, the Court for the first time
held that each person's vote must count mathematically as much as any other's." The
plaintiff voters in Gray challenged the use of county units as the bases for counting votes
in a statewide Democratic primary election. 80 Under this system, the vote of a citizen
counted for less as the population of his county increased. 8 ' The plaintiffs claimed that
the vote counting system diluted their urban votes because the votes of citizens in the less
populated rural counties counted proportionally more than those of citizens in the heavily
populated urban counties. 82 Finding the Democratic Committee's holding of a primary
election to he "state action" for purposes of the fourteenth amendment," the Court held
that the vote counting method unconstitutionally "weighted" the votes of rural voters."
"The conception of political equality," the Court stated, "can mean only one thing — one
person, one vote."'" Despite Justice Harlan's argument in dissent that a variety of factors
are important to voting equality," the Gray Court adopted mathematical population
equality among voting districts as the judicially manageable standard which the courts
were to apply in reviewing voting cases."
After Gray, political parties were required to accord equal weight to all votes in
statewide primary elections."" Gray was not, however, a districting case in that it did not
involve a state legislature's drawing of legislative voting district lines." The one person-
one vote rationale developed in Gray was subsequently extended by the Court to apply to
legislative districting." The Court applied the one person-one vote standard to legislative
districting cases under two distinct constitutional provisions. 8 ' In cases involving a state
legislature's apportioning of congressional voting districts, the Court considered the issue
of voting equality under article I, section 2 of the Constitution." Cases involving the
drawing of district lines for state legislative seats, on the other hand, were examined by
the Court under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment." This differ-
ence in analysis led to dichotomous results between the two lines of cases.
78 Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 327-30 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
78 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
78 Id. at 381.
" Id. at 370.
81 Id. at 372.
82 Id. at 371.
83 Id. ar 374.
84 Id. at 380-81.
89 Id. at 381.
88 Id. at 385 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 283-84 (1948)).
87 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
88 Id.
" See supra note 7.
" See infra notes 94-107 and accompanying text.
9 ' See infra notes 94-107 and accompanying text.
" Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-9.
83
 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560.
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The first case to apply the one person-one vote standard of Gray to congressional
districting was Wesberry v. Sanders." The Wesberry Court held that "as nearly as is practica-
ble" congressional voting districts must be of equal population. 95
 Plaintiff voters in
Wes berry, residents of Georgia's Fifth Congressional District, alleged that their votes were
unconstitutionally diluted because the Fifth District had a population more than twice
that of the average Georgia congressional district." Justice Black, speaking for the Court,
held that article 1, section 2 of the Constitution was controlling with respect to the voting
requirements for congressional elections. 97 After a review of the constitutional history of
article 1, section 2, Justice Black concluded that the Constitution requires equipopulous
congressional districts so that each person's vote counts equally in electing a Representa-
tive to Congress. 99
 Accordingly, the Court held Georgia's congressional districting plan to
be an unconstitutional malapportionment. 99
Subsequent to Wesberry, the Court expanded the reach of the one person-one vote
standard to state legislative districting in Reynolds v. Sims.'" Reynolds involved a challenge
to the districting scheme for seats in the Alabama State Legislature. 10 ' Alabama legislative
voting districts had not been reapportioned since 1900 and had become grossly malap-
portioned by 1962 due to uneven population growth in the various districts.'" The
Reynolds Court held that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment applies
to state legislative districting,'" and that the existing malapportionment of the voting
districts unconstitutionally diluted the franchise of voters in the larger districts.'" The
Court found such a dilution or debasement of the weight of a citizen's vote to be as
effective a denial of the right to vote as the outright prohibition of the franchise. 105
Rejecting an analogy to the United States Congress, wherein only one of the houses is
chosen by population, the Court held that both houses of a state legislature must be
composed of representatives elected from equipopulous districts.'" The Reynolds Court
emphasized that in apportionment litigation, population was to he the starting point of
consideration and the controlling criterion of constitutionality under the equal protection
clause.'"
The Court in Reynolds noted, however, that "mathematical nicety [was] not a constitu-
94 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
95 Id. at 7-8.
" Id. at 2-3.
" Id. at 7-9.
" Id. at 7-8, 18.
99 Id.
1" 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
101 Id. at 537.
1" Id. at 540. Interdistrict population variances ranged from 41-1 in the Alabama Senate, and
16-I in the Alabama House. Id. at 545. The smallest state senate district contained 15,417 people
while the largest contained over 600,000 people. Id. at 546.
1" Id. at 560.
10' •la at 568.
1" Id. at 555.
1" Id. at 571-77. Alabama pointed out that in the United States Senate all states are allowed two
Senators regardless of the disparities in population among the states. Id. Consequently, Alabama
argued, a state should also be free to base membership of one house of its legislature on geographic
rather than population concerns. Id. The Reynolds Court does an unsatisfactory job of refuting this
"federal analogy," arguing only that different historical considerations underlie the requirements for
membership in the Senate and the state legislatures. Id.
107 Id. at 567.
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tional requisite" under the fourteenth amendment.'" Moreover, the Court stated that
certain rational state policies might justify some deviations from equal population among
voting districts.'" Permissible state policies mentioned by the Court that could be used to
justify some population disparities included maintaining the integrity of political subdivi-
sions, and providing for compact and contiguous districts."° The goal of legislative
apportionment, proclaimed Chief Justice Warren, is "the achieving of fair and effective
representation for all citizens.""'
The Supreme Court refined the Reynolds formulation regarding state legislative
districting in Swann v. Adams."' In Swann, voters challenged a Florida Legislature redis-
tricting plan in which population deviations among districts ranged as high as 25% in the
Florida Senate, and 33% in the Florida House." 3 The Court found that the interdistrict
population deviations in the Florida plan were unconstitutionally large and must be
justified by some valid state policy. 114 When Florida failed to justify its plan, the Court
held that the plan's malapportionment violated the equal protection clause. 15 Sig-
nificantly, however, the Swann Court reaffirmed the dicta in Reynolds that "mathematical
nicety" was not required in apportioning districts for state legislatures and stated that
"some" population variances, although not variances as high as those in the Florida plan,
could be dismissed as de minimis. 18 Swann thus clarified the scope of review for state
legislative apportionment plans. A state plan with interdistrict population deviations
would not violate the fourteenth amendment if those deviations were either considered
de minimis or justified by an acceptable, rational state policy.
Although the Swann decision signaled some judicial leniency regarding slightly
malapportioned state legislative districting plans evaluated under the fourteenth
amendment, the Court's subsequent decision in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler" 7 evidenced that
congressional districting plans would be reviewed more strictly under article I, section 2.
The Missouri redistricting plan challenged in Kirkpatrick contained a maximum popula-
tion deviation among districts of 5.97% and an average deviation of 1.6%." 8 Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, interpreted the standard established in Wesberry — that .
congressional districts must be of equal population as nearly as is practicable — to require
that any population deviations be deemed unconstitutional unless the deviations were
unavoidable despite a good faith effort to achieve absolute equality."° In the instant case,
I" Id. at 569.
' 0U Id. at 577-81.
Id. at 578.
"' Id. at 565-66.
1 " 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
13 Id. at 442.
'" Id. at 444. In Swann, acceptable justifications included recognition of political subdivisions,
natural or historic boundary lines, or maintenance of compact and contiguous districts. Id. (citing
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578-79).
15 Swann, 385 U.S. at 443-44.
"6 Id. at 444. Beyond stating that some population variances would be considered de minimis,
the Court in Swann did not consider what percentage level of deviation this de minimis line would be.
The Court merely stated that variations of 30% or 40% would not be de minimis. Id.
In Kilgarin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967), the Court further clarified the Swann rule and held that
maximum deviations of 26% would not be considered de minimis. Id. at 122. Kilgarin, decided per
curiam one month after Swann, rejected a malapportioned plan redistricting the Texas House of
Representatives. Id. at 121-22. See also infra note 152 and accompanying text.
" 7 394 U.S. 526 (1969). See generally 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 152 (1969).
'" Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 529.
'" Id. at 531.
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the Court held, the existence of other reapportionment proposals with smaller population
deviations established that the variances in the Missouri plan were not unavoidable,' and
therefore, the burden shifted to the defendants to justify the population variances.'" The
Court explicitly rejected the contention that, without more, some population disparities
were per se acceptable as de minimis, stating that "the state must justify each variance,
no matter how small." 122 Any avoidable variances, the Court held, would require the state
to show that. the variances were the necessary results of effecting a rational state policy. 123
The Court proceeded, however, to reject most possible justifications a state might offer.'"
Missouri claimed that its variances resulted from its attempts to consider partisan con-
cerns, to avoid fragmenting political subdivisions, and to create compact districts.' The
Court found Missouri's goals "legally unacceptable" reasons for failing to achieve popula-
tion equality. 126
Any doubt that congressional and state legislative districting cases were to be ad-
judged differently under article I, section 2 and the fourteenth amendment respectively,
was resolved by the Court's decision in Mahan v. Howell .' 27 In Mahan, the Supreme Court
held that a plan apportioning districts for the Virginia Legislature did not violate the
fourteenth amendment.' 28 despite a maximum population deviation of 16.4%." The
Court held that the plan was justified by the state's efforts to maintain the integrity of
political subdivisions" — a justification rejected for congressional plans in Kirkpatrick.'
The Court stated that although population is the sole criterion for determining the
validity of congressional districting plans under article I, section 2, broader latitude is to
be afforded the states under the equal protection clause.' 32 The Court reasoned that
because states will usually have more state legislative than congressional seats, allowing
stales to use political subdivision lines to a greater extent in state legislative districting was
reasonable.' 33 Furthermore, since local concerns are addressed more often at the state
level, and local governments are frequently charged with carrying out responsibilities
'" Id. at 531 -32.
121 Id. at 532.
in Id. at 530-31.
129 Id.
'" See id. at 533-36; see also id. at 537 (Fortas, J., dissenting) ("(The Court] then proceeds to
reject, seriatum, every type of justification that has been — possibly, every one that could be —
advanced.").
The Kirkpatrick Court did not, however, reject all possible justifications. For instance, the
majority in Kirkpatrick stated that a state's attempts to account for projected population shifts
throughout the decade could justify some population variances as long as these projected shifts were
thoroughly and sufficiently documented. Id. at 535. See also infra notes 338-41 and accompanying
text.
Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 533 -36.
' 26 Id. In Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969), a New York congressional districting case
decided the same day as Kirkpatrick, the Court applied the Kirkpatrick test to invalidate a plan with a
13.1% maximum population deviation. Id. at 546.
"7
 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
12" Id. at 324-25.
129 Id. at 319.
`" Id. at 329.
"' Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 533
-34.
'" Mahan, 410 U.S. at 322.




delegated by the state, according political subdivisions as political subdivisions some voice
in the state houses is important, the Court noted."'
The emerging dichotomy between the two lines of cases -- the congressional and the
state legislative districting cases — was further evidenced in Gaffney v. Cummings , 135
According to the Court, the plaintiffs in Gaffney failed to make out even a prima facie
violation of the fourteenth amendment in challenging a Connecticut Legislature reappor-
tionment. plan with a maximum population deviation of 7.83% among districts of the
Connecticut House, 136 Deviations of this size, the Court considered, were too small to even
necessitate justification by the state. 137 Noting that the more stringent. Kirkpatrick standard
prohibited any such deviations from being considered de minimis in congressional dis-
tricting cases,'" the Court stated that more flexibility was to he accorded states in
districting for their state legislatures.' 39 Factors other than pure numerical equality are
also important to fair and effective representation, the Court reasoned.'"
In White v. Regester,' 41 decided on the same day as Gaffney, the Court. raised to 9.9%
the level of maximum population deviation in state legislative districting plans that it
would consider de minim's.'" The Regester Court reaffirmed the reasoning of Gaffney,
and held that the deviations of almost 10% in a plan reapportioning districts of the Texas
House of Representatives were acceptable without justification by the state.'" '
A congressional districting case, White v. Weiser,"'' was also decided by the Supreme
Court along with Gaffney and Regester. At issue in Weiser was a congressional redistricting
plan containing population deviations substantially less than those found de minimis with
respect to state legislative plans in Gaffney and Regester. The plaintiffs in Weiser challenged
a Texas congressional redistricting plan with an average deviation from the "ideal"
district size of .745%, and a maximum interdistrict population deviation of 4.13%, as
being an unconstitutional malapportionment in violation of article I, section 2. 145 Al-
though these deviations were significantly less than the deviations found unacceptable in
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 148 Texas' plan was nonetheless rejected by the Weiser Court.' 47
Stressing that more mathamatically balanced alternative plans were available to the Texas
Legislature,'" the Court held that the population disparities in Texas' plan were not
unavoidable.'" The Court also found that the justifications offered by the state were
134 Id. at 321-22 (citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 580-81). The Court pointed out, however, that at
some point population deviations will simply be too high even to be justified by state policy. id. at 329.
The Court noted that, despite justification, the 16.4% maximum deviation in Mahan "may well
approach tolerable limits." Id. But see Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 840-42 (1983) (state
legislative districting plan justified despite a maximum deviation of 89%); see infra note 152.
13' 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
1" Id. at 737, 740-41.
137 Id.
in Id. at 741-42.
1 " Id. at 743-44.
' 4° Id. at 748-49.
' 4 ' 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
142 Id. at 763.
143 Id.
144
	 2 U.S. 783 (1973).
'" Id. at 785-86.
146
	 deviations in Kirkpatrick were: average deviation — 1.6%; maximum deviation — 5.97%.
Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 529.
"7 White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 790 (1973).
148 Id .
149 Id.
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insufficient to support the chosen plan,'s° and, consequently, held that the plan was
unconstitutional.' 5 t
After Weiser, two major distinctions in the treatment under the one person-one vote
standard between the article I, section 2 districting cases and the fourteenth amendment
cases could be discerned. First, in state legislative districting cases following the Reynolds-
Swann-Regester line, the Court would consider some population variances allowable as de
minimis. This de minimis level for state legislative districting plans would fall somewhere
between Lhe 9.9% deviation found acceptable in Regester, and the 16.4% deviation the
state was required to justify in Mahan v. Howell.' 52
 In congressional districting cases
following the Wesberry-Kirkpatrick-Weiser line, however, the Court would consider no
population variances to be de minimis. Second, certain state policies could justify some
population disparities in state legislative districting plans.'s3 The Kirkpatrick v. Preisler
decision, however, ruled out most state policy justifications for malapportioned con-
gressional districting plans. 154
Karcher v. Daggett clarifies in part and changes in part the application of the one
person-one vote standard in congressional districting cases. Karcher reaffirms that a rule
of mathematical equality will be strictly applied in evaluating congressional districting
planSiss The Karcher decision also further tightens this mandate by holding that. the rule
will be applied to districting plans with maximum population deviations of less than one
percent.' 56 A state may, however, under Karcher, justify some population deviations in its
congressional districting plan as necessary for achieving a legitimate state policy.' 57 Con-
cerning a state's justification of its redistricting plan, Karcher liberalizes congressional
apportionment law by allowing previously unacceptable state policy justifications for
mathematically inexact congressional redistricting plans.'sg The next section of this case-
note will examine in detail these aspects of the Karcher majority opinion as well as consider
the concurring and dissenting opinions in the case.
150 Id. at 791 -92.
` 51 Id. at 792.
152 In Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983), decided the same clay as Karcher, the Court cited
White v. Regester for the proposition that "as a general matter" maximum population deviations of less
than 10% in state legislative districting plans are considered de minimis and do not require justifica-
tion. Brown, 462 U.S. at 842-44 (citing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764 (1973)).
Brown involved a Wyoming state legislative districting plan that was upheld despite a maximum
population deviation of 89% in State House dist ricts. Id. at 846-48. The Court was at pains to explain
the seemingly incongruous result of accepting Wyoming's plan but rejecting New Jersey's plan for
having a 0.69% maximum deviation. The Court thus stressed the narrowness of its holding in Brown,
stating that it did not adjudge the constitutionality per se of an 89% deviation. Id. The Court claimed
only to allow that Wyoming's allocating one state representative to each county was constitutional
even though the Stale's smallest county had a population less than half of the average voting district.
Id. This state policy of ensuring each county a representative, the Court held, justified the minimal
disparate impact that this apportionment had on the other voters in the state. Id.
153
 See supra text accompanying notes 109- 10.
1 " See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 338-41 and accompanying
text.
'" Karcher, 46'2 U.S. at 729-33.
' 56 Id.
'7 Id. at 739-41.
''" See infra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
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II. KARCHER v. DAGGETT
In Karcher, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, affirmed the
district court's holding that New Jersey's 1982 congressional redistricting plan was uncon-
stitutional. 159 The Supreme Court stated that in a congressional districting case, the
plaintiffs initially have the burden of showing that the interdistrict population variances
in the challenged plan could have been reduced by a good faith effort to draw districts of
equal population. 16° If the plaintiffs are successful in showing avoidable population
variances, the Court held, the state would then bear the burden of justifying its choice of
the more mathematically inexact districting plan by asserting legitimate state interests
served by the plan in the second level of judicial inquiry.m In Karcher, the Court found,
the interdistrict population deviations in the New Jersey plan were not the unavoidable
results of a good faith effort to achieve absolute equality.' 62 Furthermore, the defendants
had failed to justify the population variances in the plan, the Court stated. 163 Accordingly,
the Court held that New Jersey's plan violated article I, section 2 of the Constitution.'"
To meet their burden of showing avoidable population deviations in the New Jersey
plan, the Karcher plaintiffs introduced evidence of other plans available to the New Jersey
Legislature which were more mathematically exact than the adopted plan.' 62 The Karcher
Court, however, found it unnecessary to base its holding on the existence of the other
plans.' 66 The Court reasoned that simply by shifting certain municipalities from one
district to another, the deviations in the New Jersey plan could have been avoided.' 67
The state defendants contended that, even if the deviations in the adopted plan were
avoidable, the deviations were so small that the Court should consider them insignificant
and uphold the plan.' 68 The defendants noted that the margin of error in the census, the
undercount, was larger than the deviations in the New Jersey plan. 169 Since the inaccuracy
of the census is greater than one percent, the defendants reasoned, the deviations of less
than one percent in the New Jersey plan should be considered de minimis.'" The Karcher
Court rejected the argument that the deviations in the adopted plan were so small as to be
insignificant."' Kirkpatrick, the Court noted, had already dismissed the contention that
some population variances in congressional districting plans should be acceptable per se
as de minimus. 12 Moreover, the Court stated, that the percentage of census undercount
"3 Karcher, 462 U.S, at 727.
160 Id. at 729-31.
161 Id .
'" Id. at 737-41.
L 8a Id. at 742-44.
164 Id.
163 Id. at 737-39.
"38 Id. at 737-41.
167 Id.
1" Id. at 729-31.
1 " As noted, the maximum deviation in the New Jersey plan was 0.69%. Id. at 727-29. The
defendants introduced an affidavit of Dr. James Trussell, a Princeton University demographer,
which concluded that "the undercount in the 1980 census [was] likely to be above one percent." Id. at
735-37. The Court noted that other estimates of the national undercount in previous censi ranged
from 2.5% to 3.3%. Id. at 736 n.7. The margin of error officially recognized by the Census Bureau is
2.3%. Id. at 770-71 n.4 (White, J., dissenting).
"° Id. at 729-33.
171 Id.
"2 Id. (citing Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530).
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was larger than the deviations in the challenged plan should not make the avoidable
population deviations any more acceptable for two reasons.'" First, although the census is
less than perfect, the Coutt noted, it is the best population data available, and should be
used as the benchmark of real relative population levels.'" Second, the Court continued,
to the extent the undercount is distributed evenly among districts, it becomes irrelevant
because the existence of an undercount in the census only indicts districting accuracy
insofar as the undercount varies among districts.'" The Court found, however, that the
relative distribution of the undercount had not been shown.'" In sum, because the
defendants had not shown with any precision relevant flaws in the census data, the Court
concluded that the census itself must remain the apportioning standard.' 77
In addition to the insufficiency of the defendants' statistical argument, the Court
gave three reasons for rejecting a de minimus approach. First, the Court stated, using a
standard other than absolute equality would lead to erosion of the constitutional guaran-
tee of equal representation.'" To regard some population deviations as per se acceptable,
the Court contended, would be to reject the premise of Wesberry and Kirkpatrick that only
population equality among districts reflects the goal of voting equality expressed in article
I, section 2. 179 Legislators might strive to achieve the de minimus level rather than
equality, the Court postulated.'" Moreover, the Court reasoned, no non-arbitrary stop-
ping point exists at which to draw the line."' As between "equality or something-less-than
equality," only the former will suffice, the Court stated.'" Second, the Court concluded
that, given the state of computer technology, drawing districts of equal population is
relatively simple.'" Third, the Court noted that the Wesberry-Kirkpatrick line of cases
recognizes that different weight is accorded to local interests in deciding districting cases
under the fourteenth amendment rather than article 1, section 2. 1 " Local interests assume
greater importance in cases involving state legislative districts evaluated under the four-
teenth ammendment, the Court recognized.'" With congressional districting, however,
the concerns of national representation outweigh these local interests, the Court rea-
soned, and hence population equality must be the controlling criterion under article I,
section two.'"
Having found that the population deviations in the New Jersey plan were neither
unavoidable nor de minimus, the Court held that the burden then shifted to the state to
justify its plan.'" According to the Court, the state must show, with specificity, that the
'" Id. at 735-39.
'" Id. at 737-39.
'" Id. at 735-37.
' 78 Id. The Court noted that Dr. Trussell's affidavit showed that undercount distribution is
"impossible" to determine except on a national scale. Id.
177 Id. at 737-39.
178 Id. at 729-33.
' 19 Id. at 731-33.
180 Id.
0 " Id. The majority apparently regarded one of the benefits of a rule of absolute equality as
providing a definitive, clear cut standard. "If we accept [that a 0.69% deviation is de minimis]," the






187 Id. at 739-41.
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deviations in its plan were necessary to achieve a legitimate state objective.'" If the state
could make such a showing, the Court noted, the plan would be upheld.'" A court's
review of a districting plan would be flexible, the Court stated, and depend upon a
case-by-case analysis.'" To determine whether a plan's deviations were justifiable, the
Court continued, a court should weigh the size of the interdistrict population deviations
against the importance of the state interest asserted." The availability of alternative
means of achieving the state's objective should also be considered, the Court added.'"
The Court considered that state policies potentially justifying some minor population
variances could include making districts compact, respecting political subdivision lines,
preserving prior districts, and avoiding contests between incuinbents.' 93 In Karcher, the
court found that the proffered justification — preserving minority voting strength —
was unsubstantiated; however, the Court did not state that preserving minority voting
strength was not a legitimate state interest.'" The Court noted that the defendants
asserted that they had attempted to preserve the voting strength of minority groups in the
Tenth District.'" According to the Court, however, the most malapportioned districts
were the Fourth and Ninth (the two largest), and the Third and Sixth (the two smallest).'"
None of these four districts, the Court observed, bordered on the Tenth District.'"
Preserving minority voting strength in the Tenth District could not justify the population
variances in noncontiguous malapportioned districts, the Court found. 19" Consequently,
the Court concluded that the district court was correct in finding no causal relationship
between the deviations in the plan and the purported justification.' The deviations, the
Court reasoned, could not be considered necessary to achieve a legitimate state objec-
tive. 2" Accordingly, the Court held New Jersey's districting plan unconstitutional.'"
In sum, the Karcher Court applied a two-part test in analyzing whether New Jersey's
redistricting plan was unconstitutional under article 1, section 2. First, the plaintiffs are
required to show that the population deviations in the challenged plan could have been
reduced with a good faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality among dis-
tricts. 2" If the plaintiffs succeed in showing avoidable population deviations, the burden
then shifts to the state to justify the deviations in its plan. 2" In the second level of judicial
inquiry, the state must justify the population deviations in its plan as necessary for
L" Id.
"9 Id.
190 Id. at 739-42.
' 91 Id.
In Id.
193 Id. at 739-41. Other than stating that some "minor" population deviations could be justified
by state policy, the Court gave no indication of how large justifiable population deviations could be.
Id. At some point, population deviations will be too high even to be justified by state policy. See
Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 329 (1973).









202 Id. at 729-31.
233 Id.
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achieving some legitimate state policy."' if the state fails to make this showing, the plan
will he found unconstitutional."3
Justice Stevens wrote separately in concurrence and provided the decisive vote for
the Court's holding.'" He agreed with the majority that in light of the Court's holding in
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, stare decisis required the rejection of New Jersey's claim that the
deviations in its plan were de minimus. 202 He also agreed that the deviations were
avoidable, and that the state had failed to provide adequate justification. 208 Justice Ste-
vens, however, also considered the constitutional implications of political gerrymander-
ing,209
 and took issue with the Court's Wesberry-Kirkpatrick-Karcher formulation of the one
person-one vote standard."° In Wesberry, justice Stevens noted, the Court had first held
the requirement of article 1, section 2 that Representatives be elected "by the People of the
several States," to mean that congressional districts be apportioned equally, 2 " Justice
Stevens argued that reading this one person-one vote standard into article I, section 2 is
unsound. 2 " He contended that article I, section 2 speaks only to apportionment of
congressional 'representatives among the states by Congress and says nothing of the
composition of districts within a state." 9 Justice Stevens concluded that the one person-one
vote standard of voting equality should instead be applied to congressional districting via
2" Id.
205 a
Id. at 744-46 (Stevens, J., concurring).
207 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
208
	
id. at 761-63 (Stevens, J., concurring).
200 Gerrymandering has been defined as "districting along unnatural lines to achieve partisan
advantage or some other unfair objective." Harvard Note, supra note 7, at 1283. Justice Powell refers
to gerrymandering as "'the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries and populations
for partisan or personal political purposes.' " Karcher, 462 U.S. at 786-88 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(quoting Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 538 (Fortas, J., concurring)). Numerical malapportionment is not
gerrymandering as such, but rather a means to that end. The one person-one vote standard,
therefore, by preventing numerical malapportionments, eliminates one method by which to gerry-
mander. The one person-one vote standard does not, however, proscribe gerrymandering per se. It
requires equipopulous districts and nothing more. See id. at 729-31, 734-35 n.6.
The numerical "voting equality" of the one person-one vote standard should be contrasted with
what has been called "representation equity,"See Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1975). The
right of representation equity is the right to be free of infringements on group voting power, such as
districting that prevents a group from voting as a single unit by separating the group among various
districts. See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R. FED. 29, 40-49 (1976). A right to representation equity would
protect, for example, against discriminatory dilution of the voting strength of cognizable groups such
as blacks and hispanics. See id.
Justice Stevens considered gerrymandering to occur when one racial, ethnic, religious, eco-
nomic, or political group is favored in the districting process at the expense of another. Karcher, 462
U.S. at 748-50 (Stevens, J., concurring). In Justice Stevens's view, however, all gerrymandering is
political gerrymandering since what is at stake is the existence of the particular group's poetical
power. Id. at 748-51 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 88 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring)). Justice Stevens noted that neither the one person-one vote standard, nor
any other current judicial standard protects against such gerrymanders in congressional districting.
Id.
240 Id. at 749-65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
2 " Id. at 744-46 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Werberry,
 , 376 U.S. at 18).
210 Id. at 745-46 Sc n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring).





the fourteenth amendment, which requires a state to govern impartially, and would
surely apply to action by state officials creating congressional voting districts. 2 "
The advantage of grounding the Court's reasoning in the fourteenth amendment,
Justice Stevens contended, is that the Court could consider harms to voting equality other
than mathematical vote dilution. 2 ' 5 What concerned Justice Stevens was not that the
Court's insistence on numerical equality was incorrect, but that it is inadequate.216 The
command of article I, section 2 protects only against numerical malapportionment,
Justice Stevens noted. 217 Under the Court's reasoning, Justice Stevens argued, a district-
ing plan could be acceptable if it achieved mathematical equality even though it distorted
the weight of votes through political gerrymandering.'" According to Justice Stevens, the
limited reach of article I, section 2 prohibiting only numerical malapportionment was
especially relevant in Karcher because the New Jersey plan showed obvious signs of
gerrymandering. 219 Justice Stevens would, therefore, supplement. the command of math-
ematical equality with an additional test to protect voting equality in congressional district-
ing from forms of discriminatory vote dilution other than numerical malapportionment,
such as political gerrymandering. 220 Such a test, assessing the fairness of apportionment
plans in numerical and other relevant respects, Justice Stevens asserted, could be applied
through the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 22 '
Justice Stevens proposed a three part. objective test to consider other types of vote
dilution."' Under the test, to make a prima facie showing of discriminatory vote dilution
plaintiffs must show, first, that they belong to a politically salient class whose geographic
distribution could have been considered in districting; second, that their proportionate
voting strength had been adversely affected by the plan; and third, that sufficient
objective indicia of discrimination exists. 223 Justice Stevens stated that this third require-
ment could be met by showing that the challenged plan radically departed from tradi-
tional neutral districting criteria, for example, that the plan disregarded political subdivi-
214 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 746-48 (Stevens, J., concurring).
215 Id. at 746-50 (Stevens, J., concurring). Article 1, section 2 protects only against numerical
malapportionment, as Justice Stevens noted. Id. at 750-53 (Stevens, J., concurring). See,e.g., Kirkpat-
rick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I (1964). If the fourteenth
amendment were applicable to congressional districting, Justice Stevens argued, any type of discrim-
inatory vote dilution would be proscribed. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 746-55 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens reasoned that since the fourteenth amendment requires the slate to act evenhan-
dedly, discrimination in the districting process is prohibited. Id. at 746-50 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens contended that discriminatory districting can be accomplished by means other
than numerically devaluing the weight of a person's vote. Id. at 744-46 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens argued that districting plans, even if mathematically exact, which favor one political,
religious, racial, ethnic, or economic group at the expense of another, also discriminatorily dilute the
weight of votes. Id. at 748-53 (Stevens, J., concurring). Accordingly, Justice Stevens would hold that
n umerical vote dilution is only one form of discrimination against rights of voting equality forbidden
by the equal protection clause. Id. The other forms of discriminatory vote dilution would he
unconstitutional as well, Justice Stevens argued. Id.
21" Id. at 751-53 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also supra note 215.
217 462 U.S. at 750-53 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also .supra note 215.
21" See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 750-53 (Stevens, J., concurring). For a definition of gerrymandering
see supra note 209.
21' 462 U.S. at 761-65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
22° Id. at 750-55 (Stevens, J., concurring).
221 Id. at 746-50 (Stevens, J., concurring).
222 Id. at 753-55 (Stevens, J., concurring).
223 Id.
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sion lines, contained irregularly shaped districts, or was malapportioned. 224 Once plain-
tiffs had established a prima facie case, Justice Stevens concluded, the burden would then
shift to the state to justify its plan's infirmities as necessary to achieve a legitimate state
policy. "5
if the above test had been applied in the present case, justice Stevens inferred that
New Jersey Republicans would have had a cause of action under the fourteenth amend-
ment for vote dilution through political gerrymandering. 226 justice Stevens stated that the
New Jersey plan was designed to increase the number of Democrats and to decrease the
number of Republicans that New Jersey's voters would send to Congress. 227 Justice
Stevens noted that the case was tried in the district court only on the issue of an alleged
article I, section 2 malapportionment, however, and not on a fourteenth amendment
theory. 228 He settled, therefore, for concurring in the majority's holding that the New
Jersey plan was an unconstitutional malapportionment. 229
Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Powell and Rehnquist concurred. 2" The dissenters argued that. the population deviations
in the New Jersey plan were only "trifling," and consequently, the plan should be
upheld." The majority's application of the one person-one vote standard to invalidate
the plan was an "unreasonable" and "draconian" response, the dissenters claimed, in light
of the minute disparities in the plan . 232
The dissenters argued that the Court's previous holdings did not require the Karcher
result, reasoning that the early districting cases must be read in the context. of when they
were decided.'" At the time Wesberry v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims were decided, the
dissent ers noted, severe malapportionments existed, with interdistrict population vari-
ances of over 50% being common. 234 Those cases, however, disavowed mathematical
precision as a "practical impossibility" and an "[uniworkable constitutional requirement,"
they added. 235 Although the Court later found the smaller deviations in Kirkpatrick and
White v. Weiser unacceptable, those deviations were still many times larger than the
224 Id. at 753-59 (Stevens, J., concurring).
225 Id. at 750-51 (Stevens, J., concurring).
225 Id. at 761-65 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also infra note 227.
227 462 U.S. at 763-65 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens noted that both houses of the
New Jersey State Legislature were controlled by the Democratic party, and that the districting plan at
issue was signed into law on an outgoing Democratic Governor's last day in office before being
succeeded by a Republican Governor. Id. at 761-65 (Stevens, J., concurring). He contended that
other districting plans were rejected for political reasons, citing a letter of partisan tone by the
Democratic New Jersey Assembly Speaker. Id. at 763-65 (Stevens, J., concurring). A copy of the
above letter is provided in Daggett, 535 F. Supp. at 989 App. B; see all.° supra note 16. Justice Stevens
also stated that the New Jersey plan drastically departed from standards of compactness, calling the
district shapes "bizarre" and "uncouth." Karcher, 462 U.S. at 761-63 (Stevens, J., concurring). He
cited commentators who had given some districts such nicknames as "1 he Swan" and the Fishhook."
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing 40 CoNG. Q. 1190, 1194-95 (1982)). For a picture of the New
Jersey districting map, see Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2653, 2666 (1983); see also 40 CoNG. Q.
1190, 1190-99 (1982) (discussing the "bizarre" configurations of the New Jersey map).
223
	 462 U.S. at 744-46 (Stevens, J., concurring).
'" Id.
"" Id. at 765-67 (White, J., dissenting).
231 Id .
232 Id .
2" Id. at 765-69 (White, J., dissenting).
2S' Id. at 765-67 (White, J., dissenting).
23 ' Id. at 767-69 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 589).
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deviations in the present case, the dissenters noted. 23e Precedent thus did not require the
Court to reject New Jersey's plan, the dissenters concluded.'
The one person-one vote mandate of mathematical equality among districts should
not be taken to mean that even "statistically insignificant" population deviations will be
found unacceptable, the dissenters continued." The numbers involved in Karcher were
statistically insignificant, the dissenters contended, for two reasons. First, the dissenters
reasoned, because the census cannot claim to be accurate within less than a percentage
point, there is no proof that the minor deviations in the New Jersey plan even exist. 239 To
strive for mathematical equality beyond that which can even be measured, the dissenters
stated, "is an exercise in illusion."' Second, continued the dissenters, when compared
with other variable factors of the voting population, the deviations in Karcher were of no
real consequence.2" Therefore, the dissenters concluded that because the population
variances in question could not be shown to have any significant effect on fair representa-
tion, they should be dismissed as de minimus. 242
Additionally, the dissenters argued that the majority's decision will necessitate fur-
ther judicial intrusion into what is admittedly a legislative matter. 243 The Court has
repeatedly held, the dissenters noted, that reapportionment is primarily a political and
legislative task. 244 The dissenters pointed out that, as of the time of the Karcher decision,
twelve other states had districting plans with population deviations greater than those in
the New Jersey plan. 245 Allowing constitutional challenge even to plans with variances of
less than one percent, the dissenters contended, renders any plan open to attack from
"anyone with a complaint and a calculator."" According to the dissenters, by dismissing
•	 218. Id. The plan in Kirkpatrick had a maximum population deviation of 5.97%, and an average
deviation of 1.6%. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 529. The plan in Weiser had a maximum deviation of 4.13%
and an average deviation of 0.74%. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 785 (1973). The Karcher plan had
a maximum deviation of 0.69%, and an average deviation of 0.13%. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 727-29.
"T Karcher, 462 U.S. at 767-69 (White, J., dissenting).
"8 Id.
23" id. at 769-70 (White, J., dissenting) (citing affidavit of Dr. James Trussell, demographer).
240 Id. (quoting affidavit of Dr. James Trussell, demographer).
"I Id. at 771-73 & nn.5-8 (White, J., dissenting). For example, noted Justice White, population
growth during the decade could be very high in one district but very low in another. Id. at 771-73 Sc
n.5 (White, J., dissenting). Also, he pointed out, many people do not vote or register to vote. Id. at
771-73 & n.7 (White, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice White noted, the number of residents of
voting age could differ substantially among districts. Id. at 771-73 Sc n.6 (White, J., dissenting). Any
of these factors, Justice White argued, could dramatically differ the weight of votes, and produce far
greater and more significant disparities than the 0.69% deviation the. Court finds intolerable. Id. at
771-73 & n.8 (White, J., dissenting). For instance, Justice White noted, in the 1982 New Jersey
congressional elections only 92,852 voters cast ballots in District Ten, while 186,879 voted in District
Nine. Id. at 771-73 n.8 (White, J., dissenting). Consequently, the votes of those in District Ten
counted more than double the votes in District Nine, he concluded. See id.
242 Id. at 771-73 (White, J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 775-76 (White, J., dissenting).
2" Id. See, e.g., Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 749 (1973); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S.
73, 92 (1966); Reynolds., 377 U.S. at 586. See also infra note 324.
245 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 771-73 & n.9 (White, J., dissenting). States with plans with larger
maximum interdist population deviations than the New Jersey plan, at the time of Karcher, were:
Indiana (2.96%); Alabama (2.45%); Tennessee (2.40%); Georgia (2.00%); Virginia (1.81%); North
Carolina ( I.76%); New York (1.64%); Kentucky (1.39%); Washington (1.30%); Massachusetts
(1.09%); New Mexico (0.87%); and Arkansas (0.78%). Id. at 773 n.9 (White, J., dissenting) (citing
Council of State Governments and National Conference of State Legislatures, 1 REAPPORTIONMENT
INFORMATION UPDATE 6 (Nov. 12, 1982)).
246 Id. at 777-79 (White, J., dissenting).
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cases with insignificant deviations, the Court could avoid unneccessary judicial involve-
ment. in the districting process. 247
Most importantly, the dissenters urged, since the population variances involved in
Karcher are so small, the majority's decision does little to forward the goal of fair and
effective representation for all citizens!" In the view of the dissenters, legislators could
draw grossly gerrymandered districts that are numerically equal with the aid of comput-
ers. 245 To the extent the Court insists on this single factor, the dissenters concluded,
gerrymandering will be encouraged, because legislators will be invited to ignore other
important, neutral factors to achieve numerical exactness. 25°
Regarding the justifications states could offer io account for mathematical disparities
among districts, the dissenters agreed with the Court's acceptance of certain state policy
justifications for a deviant plan. 25 ' The dissenters pointed out that several of these
justifications had been held legally unacceptable in Kirlipatrith. 252 The dissenters wel-
comed this "overruling" of that part of Kirkpatrick,' agreeing with the Court that state
policies such as preserving traditional subdivisions and providing for compact and con-
tiguous districts are legitimate concerns justifying some interdistrict population vari-
ances.'m In light of the change on the justifications issue, the dissenters continued, the
case should be remanded io the district court to give the state an opportunity to offer
justification for its plan's population disparities. 255 The state had not offered any of the
justifications now accepted by the Court, the dissenters contended, because, relying on
Kirkpatrick and White v. Weiser, the state had reasonably concluded that such justifications
would not be acceptable. 256
Justice Powell wrote separately in dissent to stress some particular concerns regard :
ing gerrymandering."' Justice Powell agreed with Justice White that the deviations in the
241 Id. at 777-82 (White, J., dissenting).
"2 Id. at 765-67 (White, J., dissenting).
2°5 Id. at 775-76 (White, J., dissenting).
220 Id. The dissenters argued that under Karcher, legislators will disregard neutral criteria such
as existing political boundaries and compact districts, to district for political gain. Id. Legislators can
then justify this "equipopuious gerrymandering," the dissenters contended, by claiming that they
were trying to meet Karcher's strict mandate of equality. Id.
"' Id. at 779-80 (White, J., dissenting).
252 Id. (citing Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 534-36); see also supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
253 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 779-80 (White, J., dissenting).
The majority disagreed that it had overruled that part of Kirkpatrick. Id. at 741-42 & n.11. The
majority pointed out that Kirkpatrick had held that some state policies could justify a deviant plan. Id.
in Kirkpatrick the state's justifications were rejected not because they were impermissible consid-
erations, the majority contended, but because they were unsubstantiated. Id.
The language of Kirkpatrick favors the dissenters in this argument. The Court in Karcher
approved the state policy justifications of making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries,
and avoiding contests between incumbents. Id. at 739-41. As to the first of these three justifications
the Court in Kirkpatrick had stated, "a state's preference for pleasingly shaped districts can hardly
justify population variances." Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 536. The Kirkpatrick Court had found the other
two justifications "legally unacceptable" reasons for not achieving exact equality. Id. at 533-34.
' Karcher, 462 U.S. at 779-SO (White, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 782-83 (White, J., dissenting).
2" Id. New Jersey offered none of the justifications rejected by the Court in Kirkpatrick but later
approved in Karcher. See supra note 253. Evidence was presented that such factors were considered by
the New Jersey Legislature. See, e.g. , Karcher, 462 U.S. at 733 n.5, 742-43 n.12; Daggett, 535 F. Supp.
at 982. The Karcher majority noted, however, that the defendants' brief presented only the justifica-
tion of preserving minority voting strength. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 742-43 n.12.
2" id. at 784 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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New Jersey plan were insignificant and that the plan should be upheld. 25H He reiterated
the sentiment in Justice White's dissent that the search for numerical equality within
fractional percentages is "self-deluding," and ineffective as a harrier to gerrymander-
ing. 259 Justice Powell also concurred with Justice Stevens' analysis of the constitutionality
of political gerrymandering, agreeing that such an abuse of the districting process could
operate to violate the equal protection clause.'" Lastly, Justice Powell noted that the
evidence in Karcher presented a persuasive case that New Jersey's plan was an unconstitu-
tional partisan gerrymander, but that this issue was not presented.'"
In sum, the test for congressional districting plans the Karcher Court adopted re-
quires that congressional voting districts be of absolutely equal population. 262 The four
dissenters contended that some small population deviations are insignificant, cause no
harmful vote dilution, and should be considered de minimus. 2" All nine Justices agreed
that certain valid state policies could justify some interdistrict population deviations.'"
The dissenters argued that because the Court's holding regarding state policy justifica-
tions for a deviant plan represented a change in the law, the case should be remanded to
the district court to allow New Jersey to offer justification.'"
Justice Stevens, in a separate concurrence, stated that he joined in the Court's
opinion because stare deeisis required the Karcher holding."6 Throughout his opinion,
however, Justice Stevens expressed more of a concern with the overall fairness of a plan
than with its mathematical computations.'" Justice Stevens argued that the Court should
apply the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to proscribe district
gerrymandering.'" Justice Powell, in a separate dissent, endorsed this suggestion of
Justice Stevens. 289 The next section of this casenote undertakes a detailed analysis of the
four Karcher opinions, considering fully the major districting issues presented by Karcher.
III. AN ANALYSIS: KARCHER AND THE GOAL OF "FAIR AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION"
The purpose of the one person-one vote standard is to achieve "fair and effective
representation for all citizens."'" This section of the casenote will compare the merits of
the several opinions in Karcher, and consider which positions most fully comport with this
policy goal. First, the section will examine the issue of mathematical exactitude and
discuss whether the Karcher majority's strict mandate of absolute population equality, or
the dissent's argument for a de minimus line, is preferable in light of the one person-one
vote policy. The section will then consider the justifications issue, on which all members of
"8 Id.
229 Id.
zw Id. at 786-88 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 788-90 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell stated, "one cannot rationally believe that
the New Jersey Legislature considered factors other than the most partisan political goals and
population equality." Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
262 Id. at 733 -35.
263 Id. at 780-82 (White, J., dissenting).
z" Id. at 739-41; id. at 779-80 (White, J., dissenting).
265 Id. at 782-83 (White, J., dissenting).
266 Id. at 744-46 (Stevens, J., concurring).
z" See id. at 746-59 (Stevens, J., concurring).
266 Id. at 746-50 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"9 Id. at 786-89 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"I) Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565-66.
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the Court agree, and analyze whether allowing a state to justify a deviant districting plan
by state policy forwards fair and effective representation. The section will conclude with a
brief discussion of the two major districting issues remaining. after Karcher — the
dichotomous ireatment of state legislative and congressional districting cases, and the
constitutionality of political gerrymandering in congressional districting.
A. The Issue of Mathematical Exaclitude
In Karcher, the Justices split five-to-four on the determinative question of whether the
• Court's prior holdings in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler 27 ' and White v. Weiser''', if followed, would
require finding New Jersey's districting plan unconstitutional.'" The dissenters noted
that the plans invalidated in Kirkpatrick and Weiser had larger population deviations than
did the New Jersey plan. 24 Consequently, the dissenters argued, following Kirkpatrick and
Weiser should not necessarily lead to invalidating New Jersey's plan.'"
Although the dissent's reasoning is technically correct, such a narrow reading of
Kirkpatrick and Weiser ignores the plain language of the two cases. In Kirkpatrick, the Court
faced and squarely rejected the claim that some population deviations should be per se
acceptable as de minimus."" This holding was expressly reaffirmed by the Weiser COU rt. 277
Accordingly, simply because the deviations considered in Karcher were smaller does not
mean that the New Jersey plan passes muster under the Kirkpatrick holding. The Kirkpat-
rick Court held that article I, section 2 required absolute equality; only "unavoidable"
deviations were acceptable. 278 In Karcher, the state did not contend that the variances in
the New Jersey plan were unavoidable. Other plans with smaller population variances
were available to the New Jersey Legislature.'" In addition, the Court suggested changes
to the plan which would have reduced its population disparities. 28° The New Jersey plan,
therefore, could not have been accepted without directly overruling the language of
Kirkpatrick.
Thus, the Karcher holding of absolute imerdistrict population equality was in line
with precedent. The further question to be addressed, however, is how desirable the
Karcher holding is in view of the policy behind the one person-one vote standard.
Assessing the significance of the stringent mathematical test the Court adopts is crucial
because the Karcher opinion is now the benchmark to which state legislatures must refer in
devising their congressional districting plans. 28 ' The Court's decision in Karcher, then, will
"' 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
272
	 U.S. 783 (1973).
273
	 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 727; id. at 767-69 (White, J., dissenting).
274 Id. at 767-69 (White, J., dissenting); see supra note 236.
275 462 U.S. at. 767-69 (White, J., dissenting).
256 Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530.
277 White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 790 & n.8 (1973).
278 Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530-31.
255
 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 727-29.
28° Id. at 737-41.
281 Even though the Court held five-to-four in favor of an absolute equality standard, Justice
Stevens's decisive vote did not come down unequivocally in support of mathematical exactitude.
Although concurring with the majority on this issue, Justice Stevens stated that absolute population
equality is an impossibility. id. at 751-53 (Stevens, J., concurring). In fact, he questioned how
significant the variances in the New Jersey plan actually were. Id. Justice Stevens joined the Court's
holding, in the main, because stare decisis required it. Id. at 744-46 (Stevens, J., concurring). Yet
Justice Stevens's opinion indicates that his concerns are elsewhere. He supports the use of a
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directly affect the quality of the vote of citizens in all fifty states, and indirectly, the
composition of the House of Representatives. The most important point to be considered,
therefore, is the dissenters' charge that the majority's position of absolute population
equality among districts will not promote fair and effective representation. 282
When the Court first entered the arena of legislative reapportionment, Justice
Frankfurter, dissenting in Baker v. Carr, objected that the Court was entering a "political
thicket" without guiding judicial standards. 283
 The Court solved this problem by creating
a standard, one person-one vote, which required equipopulous districts. 2" This numeri-
cal standard established a judicially manageable criterion that reshaped an essentially
political problem into a legal issue. 285
 As Justice Stevens noted in Karcher, this standard is
manageable "because judges can multiply and divide." 2M The standard, however, was
created to address problems of egregious malapportionment, 282
 For example, the con-
gressional districts at issue in Wesberry v. Sanders varied from populations of 272,154 to
823,680. 288
 Similarly, the State Senate districts in Reynolds v. Simms ranged from 15,417
people to over 600,000 people. 288
 The Reynolds Court correctly found it unfair that some
citizens would have the equivalent of two, five, or twenty votes to another person's one
vote. 2"
In contrast, the Karcher Court applied the one person-one vote standard to invalidate
a plan with district populations ranging from 523,798 to 527,472 — a maximum disparity
of 0.69%."' In view of the history of the one person-one vote standard, the dissenters
contended that the Court had simply taken the standard too far.'" The deviations in
Karcher, the dissenters argued, were so small that they were insignificant. 222
 The Karcher
numerical standard because it provides a neutral criterion by which to judge a districting plan, but he
is more concerned with the overall fairness of a plan than with its mathematical shortcomings. See id.
at 750-53 (Stevens, J., concurring). Indeed, Justice Stevens considered that, as a sole criterion,
numerical equality may in fact be counterproductive. Id. at 751-53 (Stevens, J., concurring). An
overemphasis on mathematical precision, he argued, fails to take into account other criteria equally
important to fair districting. Id. Additional neutral criteria such as subdivision boundaries and
district configurations should also be considered, Justice Stevens contended. Id. at 755-59 (Stevens,
J., concurring). Justice Stevens also argued that judicial standards should be adopted to prevent
gerrymandering. Id. at 746-50 (Stevens, J., concurring).
In view of the concerns expressed in his concurring opinion, justice Stevens's critical vote cannot
be counted as inextricably supporting of absolute equality. On the whole, Justice Stevens's opinion
may indicate a willingness to be more flexible towards a plan's mathematical imprecisions if other
enforceable judicial standards are available to protect against unfair districting. Since the four
dissenters also disfavor numerical exactitude, id. at 765-69 (White, J., dissenting), a future shift in
emphasis by the Court away from an absolute equality standard is possible. See also infra notes 355-69
and accompanying text.
z" 462 U.S. at 765-67 (White, J., dissenting).
"3 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 277-78 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing Colegrove v.
Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946)).
2" See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
2"s Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE
L.J. 635, 666 (1982).
Karcher, 462 U.S. at 750.51 (Stevens, J., concurring).
287 Id. at 765-69 (White, J., dissenting).
288
 Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 2.
zl" Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 545-46.
'" Id. at 562.
"' Karcher, 462 U.S. at 727-29.
292 Id. at 765-69 (White, J., dissenting).
299 Id. at 767-69 (White, J., dissenting).
586	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:563
decision adds no protection against vote dilution, the dissenters reasoned, because at this
level no dilution has occurred in any meaningful sense.'" Consequently, the dissenters
concluded, such deviations should be- deemed de minimus. 2"
The majority's position favoring an absolute equality standard is, however, a sound
one in principle. A rule of absolute equality cannot, in itself, harm the quality of the vote.
As the majority pointed out, equality is preferable to something less than equality.'"
Justice Stevens observed that, all other things being equal, the plan most closely approach-
ing population equality would be the fairest plan."" If the Karcher mandate of mathemat-
ical exactitude fails to promote fair and effective representation, therefore, it must be
because of some incidental effects of its application. The dissenters acknowledged as
much, agreeing that in theory an absolute equality standard is acceptable, but arguing
that in practice it operates undesirably.'"
The dissenters articulated two main criticisms of the application of an absolute
equality standard. First, the dissenters claimed, it encourages gerrymandering;299 and
second, it leads to unjustified judicial intrusion into the legislative task of districting.'"
The dissenters' first contention is that legislators will disregard other objectively neutral
criteria, such as subdivision and geographical boundaries, to achieve numerical equal-
ity."' Disregarding these criteria, the dissenters asserted, will result in district lines being
drawn through established communities.'" Consequently, the dissenters continued,
localized groups with similar concerns can be fragmented among districts, leaving them
without a consolidated voice"' Legislators are then invited to gerrymander by choosing
which groups will be fragmented and have their voting strength reduced, the dissenters
concluded.'" Legislators will be able to justify this "equipopulous gerrymandering," the
dissenters added, by claiming to be obeying the mandate of population equality.'" The
dissenters contended that application of a de minimus standard would eliminate this
ability of states to justify a gerrymander in the name of absolute population equality.'"
The majority agreed that a rule of absolute equality may do little to prevent ger-
rymandering, observing that the objective of achieving population equality is "far less
ambitious" than addressing the constitutionality of gerrymandering."' A strict equality
standard does, however, force a state to justify its deviations with specific reasons, the
majority argued, and this requirement could act as a check on gerrymandering.'" The
majority emphatically denied that this standard could actually encourage gerrymander-
ing, noting that nothing stops the states from legislating against the practice,'"
294 Id. at 771.73 (White, J., dissenting).
"' Id.
296 Id. at 731-33.
2" Id. at 751-53 (Stevens, J., concurring).
298
 Id. at 775-76 (White, J., dissenting).
"'9 Id.
366
 Id. at 777-79 (White, J., dissenting).







 Id. at 779-80 (White, J., dissenting).
307 Id. at 734-35 n.6.
308 Id.
309 id.
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The majority's point here is well taken. Gerrymandering is not so much a function of
the demand for population equality as it is a result of the lack of other standards to
prevent unfair districting practices."' Accordingly, although an absolute equality stan-
dard does nothing to prevent gerrymandering, it should not be faulted as promoting
gerrymandering. Rather, emphasis should be given to the adoption of additional judicial
criteria to proscribe gerrymandering. 3 "
Similarly, the dissent's de minimus standard would add nothing to the law to inhibit
gerrymandering. Gerrymanders could also, of course, be constructed which do not rely
upon achieving absolute equality for their justification, 312
 In the absence of other stan-
dards, a de minimus rule would merely find some plans as per se acceptable despite
possible gerrymandering. 313 To ensure fair representation, judicial standards which con-
sider a districting plan in all relevant aspects, and not solely its numerical proportions, are
needed. 314
3 m See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969). The Kirkpatrick Court argued that the
demand for absolute equality does not encourage gerrymandering but rather makes gerrymander-
ing snore difficult by removing one of the means, malapportionment, by which to gerrymander. id. at
534 n.4.
See also Backstrom, Robins & Eller, Issues in Gerrymandering: An Exploratory Measure of Partisan
Gerrymandering Applied to Minnesota, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1121 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Backstrom].
The authors expressly rejected the suggestion that a standard of absolute equality encourages
gerrymandering. Id. at 1126. They argued that the standard does not stop gerrymandering, but it
does make it more difficult. Id.; See also Baker, One Man, One Vote, and "Political Fairness" — Or, How
the Burger Court Found Happiness By Rediscovering Reynolds v. Sims, 23 EMORY L.J. 701 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Baker]. Baker argued that more flexible standards are needed to achieve fair
representation. Id. at 708-16. A "sterile and mechanistic" mathematical application of the one
person-one vote standard is not the answer to gerrymandering, he contended. Id. Baker suggested
that more attention should be paid by state legislatures to local boundary lines and compactness of
districts. Id.
3 " See infra note 314.
31 ' See generally Backstrom, supra note 310; DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPOR-
TIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 456-99 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1968) [hereinafter cited
as Dixon].
3 ' 3 For example, the result in Karcher urged by the dissent would have upheld the New Jersey
plan without consideration of whether it was a political gerrymander. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 782-83
(White, J., dissenting). That such an outrageous gerrymander as the New Jersey plan could be
acceptable under currently enforceable judicial standards is striking evidence of the need for the
application of additional judicial standards to prevent gerrymandering.
3 ' 4 See id. at 746-50 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens argues that the one person-one vote
standard must he supplemented with judicial criteria under the fourteenth amendment to protect
against legislative gerrymanders. Id.; see supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text. See also En-
. gstrom, The Supreme Court and Equipopulous Gerrymandering: A Remaining Obstacle in the Quest for Fair
and Effective Representation, 1976 ARIZ. Sr. L.J. 277 [hereinafter cited as Engstrom]. Engstrom noted
that reliance on population equality, without more, cannot prevent gerrymandering. Id. at 278-79.
He criticized Kirkpatrick v. Preisler for rejecting adherence to political subdivision lines and compact-
ness as justifications for a districting plan. Id. Attention to these criteria would not eliminate
gerrymandering, he contended, but it would place some constructive restrictions on the ability to
gerrymander. Id. Engstrom argued that judicial standards under the fourteenth amendment's
guarantee of equal protection are needed to prevent gerrymandering. Id. at 296, 314-19; see also
Edwards, The Gerrymander and "One Man, One Vote", 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 879 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Edwards]. Edwards considered the one person-one vote standard to be a significant gain towards
voting equality. Id. at 879. He contended, however, that it does not prevent manipulation of district
lines through gerrymandering. Id. at 879-80. The Court should apply the equal protection standard
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The dissenters' second criticism of the application of a rule of absolute equality was
that it causes unnecessary judicial involvement in the legislative process of districting. 3 "
The dissenters noted that a plaintiff need only show that a plan's deviations could have
been lessened to make out a prima facie case under this standard Any state plan with
more than one congressional district will have reducible deviations, the dissenters con-
tended." If deviations of even less than one percent are actionable, the dissenters
concluded, nearly every state plan is now subject to legal attack. 3 " The dissenters would
avoid this problem by dismissing minor deviations as per se acceptable. 319 The dissenters
suggested a de minimus level of maximum population deviation of around 5%. 32"
More litigation and judicial involvement in districting result from a standard of
absolute equality than from a de minimus standard. At. the time of the Karcher decision,
twelve states had congressional districting plans with maximum population deviations
greater than the challenged deviation in the New Jersey plan. 33 ' Moreover, perfect numer-
ical equality is virtually impossible to achieve in states having several districts. 322 After
Karcher, therefore, almost every state's congressional districting plan is now subject to
legal challenge as being in violation of the one person-one vote standard. 323 The dissen-
ters' de minimus standard, on the other hand, would regard plans with deviations of less
than 5% as per se acceptable and thus nonlitigable on the claim of numerical malappor-
tionment.
The issue to be resolved, then, is whether the judicial involvement in districting which
Karcher allows is justified to preserve fair and effective representation, or whether the
dissent's call for judicial restraint is a preferable approach. As the dissenters correctly
pointed out, the Court has consistently stated that districting is primarily a legislative
function. 324 State legislatures are delegated the districting task by article 1, section 4 of the
of the fourteenth amendment to prohibit gerrymandering as invidiously discriminatory, Edwards
argued. Id. To determine whether there has been a violation of equal protection by the state
legislature, Edwards contended, the Court should promulgate minimum anti-gerrymandering stan-
dards. Id. at 893-97. He suggested that these standards should include compactness and contiguity of
districts, and avoidance of fragmenting political subdivisions. Id.
316
 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 771-75 (White, J., dissenting). The dissenters argued that the Kirkpatrick
demand for absolute equality has already led to extensive litigation. Id. at 777-79 (White, J.,
dissenting). They contended that, as a result, the courts have drawn 25 to 35% of current con-
gressional district lines. Id. (citing American Bar Association, Congressional Districting 20 (1981)).
3 ' 6 Id. at 771-75 (White, J., dissenting),
3 ' 7 Id.
3 ' 8 Id.
319 Id. al 780-82 (White, J., dissenting).
32"
 Id. (Justice White suggested that a five percent de minimis level seemed reasonable but that
he was "not wedded" to an exact figure).
321 See supra note 245.
322 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 751-53 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 767-79 (White, J., dissenting)
(citing Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17-18).
Id. at 773-75 (White, J., dissenting).
3" See, e.g., id. at 777-79 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 749
(1973)) ("Nor is the goal of fair and effective representation furthered [when reapportionment] is
recurringly removed from legislative hands and performed by federal courts . . ."). See also Connor
v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977), wherein the Court stated:
[A] state legislature is the institution that is by far the best situated to identify and then
reconcile traditional state policies [with] population equality. The federal courts by
contrast possess no distinctive mandate to compromise sometimes conflicting state





Constitution. 325 The Court has repeatedly noted that legislatures are better suited to
devise districting plans because districting involves political and policy choices more
appropriate for legislative than judicial determination. 320 State legislatures, the Court. has
held, are more capable than courts of identifying traditional state policies and reconciling
them in the districting process. 327 Districting should only become a judicial concern,
therefore, if the state, in districting, has failed to ensure citizens fair and effective
representation by adopting a plan which allows for harmful vote dilution."
In the one person-one vote cases, the Court has recognized that numerical malappor-
tionmenr is one form of vote dilution that can deprive citizens of fair representation. 325
The dissenters in Karcher argued, however, that the one person-one vot.e standard does
not presume that all vote dilution through numerical malapportionment is harmful."
The dissenters contended that gross numerical malapportionments certainly are harm-
ful,33 ' but that the malapportionment in Karcher was insignificant.' At some point, the
dissenters argued, population deviations among districts become so small that they can
only be considered meaningless, and do not produce any harmful vote dilution . 333 Conse-
quently, the Court's intrusion into the districting process to eliminate variances of less
than one percent does nothing to protect fair representation and is unjustified, the
dissenters concluded. 334 The majority disagreed, finding that the 0.69% deviations in
Karcher resulted in significant vote dilution and had to be reduced."
The dissenters' position on this issue appears the more reasonable. Little added
protection of the vote is afforded by eliminating extremely small population disparities
through a hypertechnical application of constitutional standards. Fractional percentages
of population deviation do not produce a constitutionally significant harm. Moreover, any
marginal benefit which accrues by reducing these deviations is outweighed by the need,
consistently recognized by the Court, to keep districting a primarily legislative task.
Judicial intervention to proscribe variances of less than one percent cannot, therefore, be
justified. A de minimus level should be adopted to avoid such unwarranted judicial
involvement in the districting process. Given the proficiency of computers, however, (he
dissent's 5% de minimus suggestion may allow unnecessarily large deviations." A slightly
lower de minimus level of perhaps one or two percent is thus an attractive solution and
should be employed as the numerical standard in congressional districting cases.
however, a federal court is left with the unwelcome obligation of performing in the
legislature's stead . . . .
Id. at 414-15; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586 ("reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative
consideration and determination.").
325 U.S. CONST. art. I, 4, d. I Article I, section 4 provides, in relevant part: "The Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State
by the Legislature thereof . . ." See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 29.34 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
326 See supra note 324.
337 Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 419-15 (1977).
328
 Id.
325 See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555.
33° Karcher, 462 U.S. at 767-69 (White, J., dissenting).
33 ' Id. at 765-67 (White, J., dissenting).
332
	 at 767-69 (White, J., dissenting).
333 Id.
334 Id. at 765-67 (White, J., dissenting).
335 Id. at 742-44.
33" See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 314, at 281-83. Engstrom points out that with the aid of
computers, districts can be drawn with exceptional mathematical precision. Id.
590	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:563 -
The benefits of the adoption of a low de minimus rule are twofold. First, every
districting plan would not be immediately subject to attack if it failed to achieve perfect
equality. Such an approach, as noted, would place districting plans properly in legislative
hands more often. Numerical malapportionment would become a judicial concern only
when the vote dilution produced a significant harm. Second, if population deviations
were so low as to be insignificant and de minimus, litigation, if it occurred, would force
courts to address the real issues. The other considerations important to fair districting
would not be obscured by an excessive search for mathematical exactitude. As Justices
Stevens' and Powell's opinions in Karcher indicated, arguably the pertinent issue in Karcher
was not the propriety of the numerical apportionments but the possibility that political
gerrymandering had occurred. 337 If a de minimus standard had been in effect in Karcher,
this issue would more likely have been addressed. The Karcher plaintiffs would not have
been able to claim that the 0.69% deviation in Karcher violated the one person-one vole
standard because this deviation would have been deemed de minimus. The plaintiffs,
therefore, would have had to have raised the really significant issue in Karcher — that the
New Jersey plan was an unconstitutional political gerrymander.
In sum, the dissenter's position in Karcher on the issue of mathematical exactitude
more effectively forwards the policy of fair and effective representation. Neither the
majority's absolute equality standard nor the dissenters' de minimus standard will stop
gerrymandering. Additional standards are needed to provide a check on this harmful
districting practice. The majority's position of absolute equality does, however, produce
unjustified judicial intrusions into the legislative area of districting. A de minimus rule
would more often leave districting concerns with the legislatures, while still protecting
against harmful numerical vote dilution. It would also encourage resolution of meaning-
ful issues when a plan's population deviations were not significant. Accordingly, a low de
minimus rule should be the applicable constitutional standard in adjudication of con-
gressional districting cases under the one person-one vote requirement.
B. The Justifications Issue
The Court's decision in Karcher, by overruling Kirkpatrick v. Preisler in part and
holding that certain state policies may justify some minor deviations from absolute
population equality,"" effects a significant change in congressional reapportionment law.
The Karcher majority held that a number of state interests could be acceptable justifica-
tions for a mathematically inexact districting plan. 739 Among the acceptable justifications,
the Court specifically included "making districts compact, respecting municipal bound-
aries, preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent
Representatives." 34° The Kirkpatrick Court had previously rejected the same justifica-
tions."'
The Karcher Court's favorable recognition of these justifications for a deviant plan
gives back to the states some of the flexibility and authority in districting an absolute
337 See supra notes 227 Sc 261 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 193 and 253.
3" Karcher, 462 U.S. at 739-41.
340 Id. A state's efforts to preserve minority voting strength or to account for projected popula-
tion shifts among districts would, if fully substantiated, also provide legitimate justification for
deviant congressional districting plans. See id. at 741.42 & n.11; Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 534-35.
34 ' Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 533
-36; see also supra note 253.
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equality standard takes away. As mentioned previously, the legislature has the primary
responsibility for districting and is the body best suited to the task. 342 The Karcher holding,
by allowing a legislature to determine its plan in consideration of these other criteria, is
consistent with the Court's previous statements that more control over districting should,
in the first instance, be vested in the legislatures. Using the leeway provided in Karcher,
legislatures can appropriately balance the concerns of state policy with the need for-
population equality. The tour Justices in dissent stated that, moreover, the Court should
give "strong deference" to a legislature's determination of the relevance and weight
accorded to the other districting factors. 343 Justice Stevens agreed with this contention of
the dissenters and provides a majority inclined to give greater weight to a state's decision
to use non-numerical districting criteria. 3" Consequently, while the Karcher mandate of
absolute equality is rigid, on the whole, the Karcher decision, by allowing for state policy
justifications of a mathematically inexact plan, could lessen judicial intrusion in this area
and give the legislatures greater power and discretion in districting. 345
The Karcher result also lessens the criticism that the Court's insistence on absolute
equality obscures consideration of other factors equally important to fair districting. 3"
The Court has never contended that fair representation is solely a function of mathemat-
ical equality, but has recognized that fair and effective representation depends on a
combination of factors. 347 For instance, giving localized groups which have a community
of interest a consolidated voice in elections is an important consideration. 3" Allowing
legislatures to apportion to preserve prior districts and respect municipal boundary lines
enables states to address this concern. 349
 Permitting states to justify plans due to efforts to
maintain compact districts further facilitates this goa1. 33° The Karcher decision, then, by
providing for consideration of these additional relevant districting factors succeeds in
supplementing the one person-one vote mandate of numerical equality with criteria for
evaluating the overall fairness of a plan. Courts now need not look at. population equality
in isolation, but can consider whether, in light of the state policies advanced, the plan
represents a fair apportionment.
The justifications accepted in Karcher, in addition, may provide a check on ger-
rymandering, Although the Court did not hold that the enumerated state policies must be
343 See supra notes 324-28 and accompanying text.
"' Karcher, 462 U.S. at 779-80 (White, J., dissenting).
914 Id. at 760 n.26 (Stevens, J., concurring).
34s
	
a state to justify a districting plan gives it a much broader defense in a one
person-one vote case. Consequently, plaintiffs will be less likely to bring suit. This practical result
supports the conclusion that after Karcher, more districting decisions will be left with the legislatures.
346 See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 751-53 (Stevens, J., concurring) (justice Stevens notes that the
justifications approved by the Karcher Court are as important, or more important, than numerical
equality in determining the overall fairness of a districting plan). See also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412
U.S. 735, 749 (1973) ("There are other relevant factors to be taken into account [in districting]
An overemphasis on raw population figures ... may submerge these other considerations"); Mahon
v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 321.22 (1973) (the Court details the importance of respecting political
subdivision boundaries in achieving a fair state legislative districting plan).
'" See supra note 346; see also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 748 (1973) ("Fair and
effective representation ... does not depend solely on mathematical equality among districts").
94"
	 e.g., Karcher, 462 U.S. at 776-78 n.I2 (White J., dissenting) (quoting CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, STATE POLITICS AND REDISTRICTING 1-2 (1982)). See also Dixon, supra note 312, at 18.
549 See sources cited supra note 348.
33° See generally Comment, Political Gerrymandering: A Statutory Compactness Standard as an Antidote
for Judicial Impotence, 41 U, CHI. L. REV. 398 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Comment].
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used by the states in districting, Karcher for the first time finds such policies to be legally
acceptable districting criteria. State legislators can therefore be expected to use these state
policies in redistricting now that they are allowed to do so. Because the state policy
justifications accepted by the Court embody objective and neutral districting factors, the
use of these districting criteria should inhibit the ability of legislators to use redistricting
for partisan or personal gain. Moreover, because the absolute equality standard allows for
a prima facie case upon a showing of any avoidable population deviation, states must be
prepared to justify their plans with the state policies accepted by the Karcher majority.
Gerrymandering is often accomplished by fragmenting localized groups among
several districts, and thereby preventing the targeted group from gaining a majority in
any one district. 35 ' A policy of respecting subdivision boundaries, however, lessens the
ability of legislators to fragment consolidated groups and thus decreases the possibility of
a gerrymander. The policy of compacting districts, would also, if followed, tend to inhibit
the ability to gerrymander. A compactness standard would prevent legislators from
diluting opposition votes by drawing far reaching lines meandering all over the map. 352
Additionally, the policy of drawing district lines to avoid contests between incumbents
could reduce the possibility of a political gerrymander. For example, in Karcher, districts
were drawn by the Democratically controlled New Jersey Legislature to place incumbent
Republicans in competition for the same congressional seat, thereby freeing other dis-
tricts for Democratic candidates. 33-2 If the policy of avoiding contests between incumbent
Representatives had been followed, this political gerrymandering tactic would not have
been employed. The justifications the Court accepts, therefore, should provide some
protection from gerrymandering. 354
Consequently, this part of the Karcher holding, which allows for some justifications
for numerically inexact congressional districting plans, forwards the policy goal of fair
and effective representation. The allowance of justifications should have the beneficial
results of returning to the legislatures districting discretion, providing for additional
criteria to judge the fairness of a districting plan, and inhibiting gerrymandering.
351 See Edwards, supra note 314 at 893-97. See also Harvard Note, supra note 7, at 1283. For a
district by district discussion of how this technique was employed in Karcher by the Democratically
controlled New Jersey Legislature to maximize the Democratic vote, see 40 CONG. Q. 1190, 1190-98
(1982). This method was used in Karcher along with the complementary gerrymandering tactic of
'packing' a large number of adverse voters within one district. See id. at 1198. That is, when it is
apparent that an opposition group will win a majority in a given district any of their votes over 51%
are therefore "wasted." See H arvard Note, supra note 7, at 1283. Consequently, it is advantageous to
pack a district with a surplus of like voters and thereby lessen the number of adverse voters in other
bordering districts. See id.
352 See generally Chicago Comment, supra note 350.
353 In Karcher, parts of several prior congressional districts were combined to form one new
district. 40 CONG. Q. 1190, 1190 (1982). This district, the Fifth, was drawn by the Democratically
controlled legislatu're to pair two incumbent Republicans in the same district and 'open up' a nearby
district for the Democrats. Id. If the policy of avoiding contests between incumbents was followed,
this ability to gerrymander to force two incumbents of the same party to run for the same seat would
be eliminated. One of the Republican incumbents in the new New Jersey Fifth District avoided this
problem by moving his residence to the Twelfth District. Id.
'4 Presumably, none of the justifications accepted by the Court in Karcher would have enabled
the New Jersey Legislature to justify its gerrymandered plan. The New Jersey Legislature flagrantly
disregarded all of the neutral criteria the Karcher Court now permits as potential justification for a
malapportioned plan. See 40 CONG. Q. 1190, 1190-98 (1982). The districts in the New Jersey plan
were not compact, did not respect municipal or prior district boundaries, and were not drawn to
avoid contests between incumbent representatives. See id.
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C. The Issues Remaining
I. The Dichotomous Treatment of State Legislative and Congressional Districting Plans
A review of the several opinions in Karcher indicates that a majority of the Court may
now be willing to consider both congressional and state legislative districting cases by the
same standards. Presently, the treatment of the two lines of cases is substantially different.
The one person-one vote standard has been applied with greater leniency in the state
legislative districting cases heard under the fourteenth amendment, than in the con-
gressional districting cases heard under article I, section 2. 2" Greater variance in popula-
tion and more liberality in incorporating legitimate state policies in the districting plans
has been allowed in the state legislative districting cases.'" A merging of the two lines of
decision would, therefore, be a significant development in reapportionment law.
In Karcher, the four dissenters, as well as Justice Stevens, criticized the distinct
treatment accorded the two lines of cases."' The dissenters contended that the Court's
application of the one person-one vote standard in state legislative cases has been reason-
able,'" but that the application of this standard in congressional cases has been too
rigid.'" State interests weigh more heavily in applying the one person-one vote standard
in state legislative than in congressional districting cases, the dissenters acknowledged.'"
The dissenters recognized that - state legislative districts are more intertwined with local
concerns and that local concerns are more usually addressed in the state legislatures than
in the Congress. 36 ' The dissenters argued, however, that the concerns relevant in con-
gressional and state legislative districting are the same, differing only in degree.'" Fur-
thermore, the dissenters added, since Karcher now allows state policy justifications for
congressional districting plans, no reason retnains for a marked difference in the treat-
ment of the two lines of cases.'" The dissenters therefore suggested "bringing together"
the state legislative and congressional cases.'"
The dissenters did not state that this merger would mean applying the one person-
one vote standard to congressional districting cases through the fourteenth amend-
ment,36" although Justice Stevens prefers that approach.'" Presumably, the dissenters
would still apply the one person-one vote standard to congressional cases through article
1, section 2. 3" Bringing together the two lines of cases sloes suggest, however, that the
standard would be applied in a similar fashion in both lines of cases.'" Applying a
consistent standard would mean, the dissenters indicated, that the much stricter treat-
ment of congressional cases which marked the distinction between the two lines of cases
ass
	 supra notes 135-54 and accompanying text.
356 See supra notes 135-54 and accompanying text.
357  Karcher, 462 ELS. at 780-82 & n.14 (White, J., dissentin0; id. at 744-48 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
358 Id. at 779-80 (White, J., dissenting).
339 Id. at 765-67 (White, J., dissenting).
336 Id. at 780-82 (White, J., dissenting).
381 Id.
362 Id.
363 Id. at 782 n.14 (White, J., dissenting).
3" Id. at 780-82 (White, J., dissenting).
36s
	 id. at 782 n.14 (White, J., dissenting).
386
	
at 746-48 (Stevens, J., concurring).
357 See id. at 782 -83 & n.14 (White, J., dissenting).
368 See id.
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would be eliminated.'" The position of the five Justices — the four dissenters and Justice
Stevens — therefore, may signal a greater liberality in the application of the one person-
one vote standard in future congressional districting cases.
A merger of the two lines of cases would be a positive development in reapportion-
ment law for three reasons. First, it would bring a logical consistency to the Court's
treatment of state legislative and congressional districting cases. Second, it would allow for
a more reasonable numerical standard than the demand for perfect equality in con-
gressional districting. Last, similar treatment. of the two lines of cases would give states
more flexibility in making determinations of applicable state policies to account for in
their congressional districting plans.
2. The Constitutionality of Political Gerrymandering in Congressional Districting
In addition to suggesting a future merger of the state legislative and congressional
districting cases, the Karcher opinions indicate that claims of political gerrymandering may
now be cognizable in congressional districting cases. The concurring opinion of Justice
Stevens, and the dissenting opinions suggested that harmful vote dilution effected
through political gerrymandering should be addressed under the fourteenth amendment
in congressional districting cases."° Gerrymandering can cause harmful vote dilution by
decreasing the voting strength of a targeted group through a manipulation of districting
lines. 371 The deleterious effects of gerrymandering on fair and effective representation
are well recognized.'" Gerrymandering has been called a far greater threat than numeri-
cal malapportionment to equality of voting rights.'" The Court has yet to hold, however,
that the gerrymandering of congressional voting districts is unconstitutional.'"
An inquiry into gerrymandering is particularly pertinent to a discussion of the
principal case. The district court, as well as Justices Stevens and Powell, pointed out
numerous strong indicia of political gerrymandering in Karcher . 3Th According to Justice
Stevens, the Democratically controlled New Jersey Legislature districted to decrease the
number of Republicans sent to Congress from New Jersey 3 76 The majority in Karcher
chose not to address the constitutionality of gerrymandering, noting that only the issue of
numerical malapportionment was presented in the district court. 3" The Court, therefore,
rested its holding solely on New Jersey's violation of the one person-one vote standard."
The application of the one person-one vote standard to congressional districting is
desirable but inadequate.'" The one person-one vote standard is a "first prerequisite" to
36' Id. at 780-82 & n.14 (White, J., dissenting).
3" Id. at 746-50 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 782-83 (White, J., dissenting).
371 Dixon, The Court, the People and "One Man-One Vote" in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970's 7, 29
(N. Polsby ed. 1971). Dixon defines gerrymandering as "discriminatory districting which operates
unfairly to inflate the political strength of one group and deflate that of another." Id. See also supra
note 209.
972 See, e.g., Karcher, 462 U.S. at 746-50 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 775.76 (White, J.,
dissenting); id. at 786-90 (Powell, J., dissenting); Edwards,supra note 314, at 879; Backstrom, supra
note 310, at 1122; Engstrom, supra note 314, at 283.
3 ^3 Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 555 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).
374 See infra notes 385-95 and accompanying text.
"5 Daggett, 535 F. Supp. at 981; id. at 984 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Karcher, 462 U.S. at 761-65
(Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 784-90 (Powell, J., dissenting).
376 462 U.S. at 763-65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"T Id. at 727, 734-35 n.6.
3' Id. at 742-44.




fair and effective representation," By eliminating mathematical inequalities among
voting districts the standard protects against dilution of an individual's vote."' In addi-
tion, it eliminates one means of effecting a gerrymander."' Group voting strength,
however, can still be discriminatorily diluted through gerrymandering if the gerryman-
der is accomplished in ways other than numerical malapportionment." Because article 1,
section 2 proscribes only numerical vote dilution, 394 the application of additional judicial
criteria under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is needed to
prevent this discriminatory abuse of the apportionment process in congressional district-
ing.
The Supreme Court has to some extent placed checks on gerrymandering. The
Court has held that racial gerrymandering of city boundaries violates the fifteenth
amendment.' Additionally, the Court has entertained, under the fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments, a claim of racial gerrymandering in a congressional districting
case. 396 Presumably, then, claims of racial gerrymandering are cognizable in congressional
districting cases."' The Court has also staled, in state legislative districting cases, that
districting plans mployed to "minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or
political elements of the voting population" violate the fourteenth amendment." In
Karcher, a majority of the Court adopted this language for the first time in a congressional
districting case." Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion in Karcher, argued that
protection from gerrymandering should not be confined to racial groups, and set forth a
comprehensive test under the fourteenth amendment for protecting all voters from
gerrymandering.390 The equal protection clause protects all citizens, Justice Stevens con-
tended, and therefore, any cognizable political group should be protected from harmful
vote dilution through gerrymandering."' Justice Powell, in his separate dissent, fully
agreed with this position. 392 The other three dissenters did not expressly endorse this
proposal of Justice Stevens, but they noted that only an article I, section 2 question was
3' Chicago Comment, supra note 350, at 398.
331
 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 751-53 (Stevens, J., concurring).
382 	Backstrom, supra note 310, at 1126-27.
m" Karcher, 462 U.S. at 751-53 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also DIXON, supra note 312, at
456-500; sources cited supra note 372.
364 See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-9.
33s
	
v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960). See also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S, 613
(1982) (at-large system of electing members to county Board of Commissioners resulted in racially
discriminatory vote dilution in violation of the fourteenth amendment).
3" Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). The Court in Wright found that the plaintiffs had
failed to show that the New York Legislature had districted along racial lines, but the Court did not
state whether racially motivated congressional districting, if proven, would violate the equal protec-
tion clause or the fifteenth amendment. Id. at 56.
387 In addition, in states covered by the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1975 (1982), racial
gerrymandering of district boundaries is forbidden. In a Voting Rights Act suit, the state bears the
burden of showing that its new districting plan does not adversely affect the minority vote. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c; see also Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
388 See, e.g., Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88-89 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433,
439 (1965) (emphasis added). Cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) (districting to achieve
"political fairness" between major political parties not a violation of equal protection).
383 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 782-83 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 746-50 (Stevens, J., concurring).
39a Id. at 748-50 (Stevens, J., Concurring).
"' Id.
392 Id. at 786-88 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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presented. 393 The dissenters did, however, suggest a willingness . to consider a fourteenth
amendment claim in a congressional districting case if one is presented. 394 The dissenters
indicated that their position in Karcher would have been different. if the plaintiffs had
demonstrated that the New Jersey plan invidiously discriminated against a racial or
political group. 993
Adoption of the test for gerrymandering advocated by Justice Stevens in his concur-
ring opinion in Karcher3" would provide for the judicial criteria needed to address the
problem of gerrymandering. Under Justice Stevens' approach, plaintiffs could establish a
prima facie case of gerrymandering under the equal protection clause by demonstrating,
first, that they were members of a politically distinct group of voters whose geographic
distribution could have been taken into account in the districting plan; second, that their
proportionate voting influence had been adversely affected by the plan; and third, that
sufficient objective evidence of districting discrimination existed. 397 Objective evidence of
discrimination would include, justice Stevens indicated, proof that the challenged plan
substantially deviated from traditional neutral districting criteria, for example, that the
plan contained malapportioned or unusually shaped districts, ignored political or geo-
graphic subdivision lines, fragmented localized political groups, or was adopted by a
process which excluded differing viewpoints. 399 Justice Stevens, however, would not
require proof that a state legislature intentionally discriminated through gerrymander-
ing. 399 If the plaintiffs succeeded in establishing a prima facie case of gerrymandering,
Justice Stevens stated, the state would then bear the burden of demonstrating that, its plan
was justified by legitimate, neutral state policies. 400
The criteria which Justice Stevens advocates for districting would lead, when applied,
to fairer apportionment plans in general. Consideration of district shapes, recognition of
political subdivision and natural boundaries, and allowance of a balanced input into the
districting process are all legitimate districting concerns which encourage the develop-
ment of districts containing people who share a community of interest and which discour-
age the use of districting for partisan or personal purposes. 40 ' Perhaps no standards can
eliminate gerrymandering, but state legislatures should riot be allowed arbitrarily to
disregard a host of recognized legitimate and neutral districting considerations. Just as
the one person-one vote standard requires a state to justify significant numerical malap-
portionments, so too states should be made to answer when they depart substantially from
other important and objective districting factors. Although enforcement of these addi-
tional criteria will necessitate more judicial involvement in districting, there is no reason to
fear that the courts will become hopelessly enmeshed in a "political thicket." Because the
districting considerations which Justice Stevens enumerates are objectively determinable
and neutral factors, they provide judicially manageable criteria for evaluating appor-




 Id. at 750-55 (Stevens, J., concurring).
397 Id. at 753-55 (Stevens, J., concurring).
3" Id, at 753-61 (Stevens, J., concurring).
333 Id. at 751-55 (Stevens, J., concurring); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 90-93 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
400
 Karcher, 462 U.S. at 759-61 (Stevens, J., concurring). •
401 See generally id. at 753-61 (Stevens, J., concurring); Baker, supra note 310; Engstrom, supra
note 314; Chicago Comment, supra note 350.
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tionment plans."' Moreover, it is not enough, as the Karcher majority would have it, that .
the states may legislate against gerrymandering."" Gerrymandering is an abuse of the
legislative process, and in the face of legislative failure, extensive judicial deference
merely leaves the victimized voters at the hands of the perpetrators. The continued
prevalence of gerrymandering is an indication that the Court should intercede to inhibit
the practice, and specifically, the Court should apply Justice Stevens' test for gerryman-
dering in congressional districting cases so that all relevant aspects of a districting plan
could be considered, and plans containing purposeful and harmful discriminatory vote
dilution could he invalidated. A requirement of intentional discrimination through ger-
rymandering should not, however, contrary to the suggestion of Justice Stevens, he
excluded under the equal protection clause, provided the intent finding is based on
objective considerations.""
Had such standards been applicable in Karcher, New Jersey Republicans would have
had a basis to seek redress for the political gerrymandering effected by the Democratically
controlled New Jersey Legislature. 405
 Protection from gerrymandering should he ex-
tended to major political parties because, as Karcher shows, in districting battles the
minority political party is a likely target and victim of gerrymandering. The objection may
be raised that a major political party, because of its extensive resources, is not in need of
protection from discrimination in the legislative process. The existence of a politically
gerrymandered districting plan, however, belies the notion that a major political party is
capable of adequately protecting its own interests from legislative abuse in districting
without constitutional protection. Moreover, as Justice Stevens points out in Karcher, the
equal protection clause protects all citizens and relief from discriminatory vote dilution
should be available to every cognizable political group.'" The need for standards prohib-
iting political gerrymandering is particularly acute in the congressional districting con-
text, because, through gerrymandering, a majority party in a state legislature can extend
its party's political dominance within the state to the state's federal representation in
Congress and thereby further repress the minority group.
402 See sources cited supra note 401.
403 See Karcher, 462 U.S. at 734-35 n.6.
4" See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 630-32 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Although
Justice Stevens would not require a finding of intentional gerrymandering, Karcher, 462 U.S. at
751-55 (Stevens, J., concurring), it is unlikely that the Court will overturn the established rule that
discriminatory intent is required for a violation of the equal protection clause in voting cases where
group discrimination is alleged. See, e.g,, Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (proof of intentional
discrimination is necessary to a finding that at-large elections system for county Board of Commis-
sioners constituted unconstitutional vote dilution of black citizens under the fourteenth amend-
ment); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (city's at-large election system did not unconstitu-
tionally dilute Blacks' votes under the fourteenth amendment where no purposeful discrimination
was shown). Nor should the Court dispense with the intent requirement, provided the finding of
intent is based on objective criteria, for two reasons. First, Justice Stevens's test is sufficiently
demanding that satisfaction of its prima facie case for gerrymandering would most likely encompass
a finding of intentional discrimination. Thus, there is no inconsistency between using Justice Ste-
vens's standard and requiring that the gerrymandering be intentional. Second, an intent require-
ment applied in addition to Justice Stevens's test would confine judicial review to the more egregious
cases of gerrymandering and not allow the courts to become entangled in a "political thicket" of cases
involving merely some disproportionate effects of districting upon a group of voters but little
evidence of true legislative abuse.
4" See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
4" Karcher, 462 U.S. at 748-50 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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In sum, it appears from the concurring and dissenting opinions in Karcher that claims
of invidiously discriminatory gerrymandering, racial or political, will be recognized under
the fourteenth amendment in congressional districting cases. The dictates of the equal
protection clause could then provide the additional judicial standards needed to neutral-
ize this harmful abuse of the districting process. This approach should be adopted by the
Court, in accordance with the guidelines provided in Justice Stevens' concurring opinion
in Karcher, to protect more effectively the ideal of voting equality from the harms of
gerrymandering, and thereby greatly enhance the prospects for achieving fair and effec-
tive representation for all citizens. 407
CONCLUSION
I n Karcher, the Supreme Court followed precedent. and held that the article I, section
2 mandate of equipopulous congressional districting allows only unavoidable interdistrict.
population deviations. The Court in Karcher extended the reach of this "one person-one
vote" standard to include maximum population deviations of less than one percent, but
recognized that a stale may justify a malapportioned districting plan by showing that the
plan's population deviations were necessary to achieve certain legitimate state policies.
Karcher thus partially overrules Kirkpatrick v. Preisler which had disallowed most state
interests as justifications for a deviant plan.
4" The Supreme Court has recently granted review in Davis v. Bandemer, 105 S. Ct. 1840
(1985), a case that will squarely present the issue of political gerrymandering in the context of state
legislative redistricting. The Bandemer plaintiffs include seven members of the Democratic Party who
allege that Indiana's 1981 apportionment law redistricting the houses of the Indiana State Legisla-
ture violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because the Republican
controlled Indiana Legislature districted for partisan gain. Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479
(S.D. Ind. 1984), review granted, 105 S. Ct. 1840 (1985). A three judge district court found that the
Democratic plaintiffs had proven discriminatory vote dilution resulting from purposeful political
gerrymandering and held that the plaintiffs were entitled to relief under the equal protection clause.
Id. The district court noted that the Supreme Court had yet to address the constitutionality of
political gerrymandering but the court relied extensively on J ustice  Stevens's concurring opinion in
Karcher, see supra notes 209-27 and accompanying text, as justification for its holding. Id. Evidence of
political gerrymandering in the I ndiana plan cited by the district court included the plan's unusually
shaped districts, disregard of existing political subdivisions, discriminatory use of multi-member
districts, and the adverse disproportionate results of the 1982 Indiana legislative elections upon
Indiana Democrats. Id. The district court acknowledged that the Indiana plan conformed numeri-
cally to the one person-one vote standard, but concluded that the partisan gerrymandering em-
ployed by the Indiana Legislature unconstitutionally discriminated against Indiana Democrats in
violation of the equal protection clause and noted that the state had failed to provide any legitimate,
rational justification for the plan. Id. The district court applied its ruling prospectively only, however,
and allowed the 1984 Indiana legislative elections to proceed under the challenged plan. Id,
The Bandemer case presents the Supreme Court with an appropriate opportunity to set forth
long overdue judicial standards to inhibit political gerrymandering. The Court should follow the
initiative of the district court and adopt the guidelines for proscribing political gerrymandering
under the equal protection clause cogently set forth by Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion in
Karcher. See supra notes 209-27 and 396-404 and accompanying text. The Court should also support
the district court's conclusion that a finding of intentional gerrymandering is required. See supra note
404; Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479 (S.D. Ind. 1984), review granted, 105 S. Ct. 1840 (1985).
Although the Bandemer case arises in the context of a state legislative districting plan, standards for
political gerrymandering should be equally applicable in congressional and state legislative districting
cases. See id. No relevant differences exist between the state legislative and congressional districting
contexts that would allow for significantly different standards for political gerrymandering. See id.
Thus, Bandemer, however decided, should be controlling precedent on the issue of political ger-




The Karcher rule of absolute equality is in theory desirable, but in practical applica-
tion it is susceptible to two criticisms. First, alone, it does little to prevent vote dilution
through gerrymandering. Second, it tends to encourage judicial resolution of districting
disputes, which are primarily a matter for the state legislatures. A low de minimus level of
population deviation would protect against meaningful numerical vote dilution, and
prevent unnecessary judicial intrusion in the districting process.
The Karcher result overall, however, should forward the districting goal of fair and
effective representation for all citizens by allowing for proper application of state policy to
justify some minor population deviations. The benefits of this part of the Karcher holding
are several — it returns to the legislatures authority and appropriate discretion in
districting, it accounts for the use of other, non-numerical criteria also important to fair
districting, and it tends to discourage gerrymandering.
Two important districting issues remain after Karcher. First, the Court in Karcher and
in previous cases has treated congressional and state legislative districting cases as distinct.
A review of the several opinions in Karcher shows a majority of the Court now favoring a
merger of the two lines of decisions. Such a merger would have the favorable effects of
bringing consistency to the Court's treatment of the two lines of cases, and allowing the
stale legislatures more flexibility in considering proper congressional districting criteria.
Second, the Court as yet has not considered the constitutionality of political gerrymander-
ing in congressional districting. The Karcher opinions indicate that a majority of the court
is now willing to consider a fourteenth amendment claim alleging that a politically
gerrymandered congressional districting plan is invidiously discriminatory. Application
of the requirements of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
congressional districting plans to eliminate harmful political gerrymandering would be a
major step towards securing fair and effective representation for all citizens.
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